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Enforcing Internationally Recognized Human Rights 
Violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act: An Analysis 
of the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Doe v. Unocal Corp. 
 
JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 18, 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
a United States based corporation can be held civilly liable for “aiding and 
abetting” the internationally recognized human rights violation of forced 
labor.  This case, Doe v. Unocal Corp.1 (Doe II), is significant for its rami-
fications to human rights litigation in United States courts as well as to 
future liability for multinational corporations conducting commerce in for-
eign states.  The uniqueness of this case is found in its precedent.  No prior 
federal court has held a corporation liable for human rights violations un-
der the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
In 1789, Congress enacted the First Judiciary Act.2  This act included a 
jurisdictional provision for district courts that granted foreign persons or 
entities the right to sue under tort law for violations committed under the 
law of nations.3  This jurisdictional law was named the Alien Tort Claims 
Act (ATCA).4  From 1789 until 1984, the ATCA underwent three minor 
  
*  Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, USAF-JAG (B.A. UCLA (1989), M.A. Purdue University (1992), J.D. 
Marquette University (1996).  Major Kastenberg received his LL.M in International and Comparative 
Law from Georgetown University (2003), graduating with highest distinction.  The author has been a 
criminal law prosecutor and defense counsel alternatively for seven years.  The author’s views in this 
article do not reflect those of any agency within the Department of Defense.  The author expresses his 
thanks to Georgetown Adjunct Professor Mark Srere of Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Washington 
DC); Georgetown Adjunct Professor Sandy Sierk of Cameron & Hornbostel LLP (Washington DC); 
Neil Posner of Sachnoff & Weaver LLP (Chicago) for his usual brilliant insight; and Elizabeth and 
Allenby Kastenberg for their very important wide-ranging help and support. 
 1. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (Doe II). 
 2. 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 3. 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
 4. This act is also referred to as the Alien Tort Statute. 
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alterations5 culminating in its present form that states:  “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”6 
For almost two centuries, little use was made of the ATCA,7 and cer-
tainly none of it for allegations of human rights violations based on inter-
national norms.8  However, in 1979 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,9 changed the dormant nature of the ATCA.10  
This case originally involved a New York District Court lawsuit between 
Paraguayan litigants for human rights violations that occurred in Para-
guay.11  The United States had no actual nexus to the violations.12  Yet, the 
Second Circuit found that United States courts had jurisdiction to hear 
cases involving human rights violations, wherever these violations occur.13   
As a result of Filartiga, several lawsuits occurred that cited human 
rights violations.  The majority of these cases involved lawsuits against 
foreign government and former foreign government officials.  Another 
result of Filartiga was legislative, rather than judicial.  In 1992, Congress 
enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) which created a cause 
of action for two violations of international law:  torture and summary 
execution.14  The TVPA also bolstered the ATCA by providing the right to  
  
 5. Joseph Modeste Sweeny, A Tort only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Hastings Intl. & 
Comp. L. Rev. 445, 449-50 (1995) (providing a detailed discussion of the substance of the alterations 
to the ATCA).  
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993). 
 7. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878, n. 21 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 8. See e.g. Dreyfus v. von Fink, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1975).  In von Fink, the Second Circuit 
held that  the ATCA’s jurisdiction dealt primarily with relationship among nations rather than individu-
als.  Specifically, that court held: 
 
There has been little judicial interpretation of what constitutes the law of nations, and no 
universally accepted definition of this phrase. . . . There is a general consensus, however, 
that it deals primarily with the relationship among nations rather than among individuals.  
“It is termed the Law of Nations—or International Law—because it is relative to States or 
Political Societies and not necessarily to individuals, although citizens or subjects of the 
earth are greatly affected by it.” 
 
Id. at 31 (quoting von Redlich, The Law of Nations 5 (2d ed. 1937)). 
 9. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 10. See id. at 887 (stating that jurisdiction has rarely been based on the ATCA).  
 11. Id. at 890. 
 12. Id. at 878. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Act of March 12, 1992, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73.  The TVPA reads in pertinent part: 
 
(a)  LIABILITY.—An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, 
of any foreign nation— 
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sue United States citizens.15  Since 1979, ATCA cases have emerged in 
three general categories.  The first of these categories involves suits by 
alien (foreign) plaintiffs against current foreign heads of state and govern-
ment.16  The second category deals with suits by foreign plaintiffs against 
former foreign heads of state and government officials.17  The third cate-
gory of ATCA suits involves civil action by foreign plaintiffs against mul-
tinational corporations conducting foreign commercial activity in conjunc-
tion with foreign governments.18  This article concerns the third category, 
in particular, an analysis of Doe II. 
This article analyzes Doe II under a multi-tiered rubric.  The first tier 
involves analyzing whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in its jurisdic-
tional interpretation.  The second tier studies the extent to which the Ninth 
Circuit’s use of international law expanded previously accepted usage by 
United States courts.  For example, after reading Doe II, a question arises 
as to whether the Ninth Circuit created a “complete” universal jurisdiction 
for torts under the ATCA.  The final tier, involves analyzing foreseen legal 
consequences.  That is, does Doe II expand causes of action for foreign 
human rights violations because the decision reduces possible defenses to 
tort claims under the ATCA?   
Within this multi-dimensional rubric, Doe II must be understood from 
its beginnings.  Section II discusses the history of Doe II, primarily through 
two prior district court decisions.  However, in order to analyze Doe II, a 
meaningful background to the ATCA must be determined.  Section III of 
  
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that 
individual; or 
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for 
damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any person who may be a claim-
ant in an action for wrongful death. 
(b)  EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES.—A court shall decline to hear a claim under this sec-
tion if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which 
the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. 
(c)  STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—No action shall be maintained under this section 
unless it is commenced within 10 years after the cause of action arose. 
 
Id. 
 15. Id.  For a brief but insightful discussion of the TVPA see Steven Ratner & Jason Abrams, Ac-
countability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremburg Legacy, 243 (2d 
ed., Oxford U. Press 2001). 
 16. See e.g. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (suing Zimbabwe’s ruling 
party); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (1995) (suing President of Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
 17. See e.g. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 
1994) [hereinafter Marcos II] (suing estate of former Philippine leader Ferdinand Marcos). 
 18. See e.g. Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6657 (N.D. Al. April 14, 
2003) (accusing an American corporation of collaboration with Columbian paramilitary); Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (accusing a Canadian 
corporation of collaborating with Sudan for ethnic cleansing). 
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this paper provides this background.  Particular attention is paid to the Fi-
lartiga decision and its progeny because Doe II relied, in large-part, on 
principles established in Filartiga.  Section IV provides context for the 
suit, namely, the nature of human rights violations occurring in Myanmar 
where the plaintiffs allege the violations occurred.  Section V analyzes the 
Ninth Circuit’s unique application of International Law.  Section VI ana-
lyzes foreseeable consequences to defenses against ATCA suits.  In par-
ticular, defenses under the act of state doctrine, dismissal under the indis-
pensable parties rule, and forum non conveniens are addressed.  This article 
concludes with the final assessment that while Doe II is rooted in funda-
mentally correct interpretations of the law, it both expands the parameters 
of corporate liability and it fundamentally alters the ability to defend 
against ATCA suits. 
II.  DOE V. UNOCAL CORP.:  FACTS AND HISTORY 
A.  Note on Unocal 
Union Oil Corporation of California (Unocal) was formed in 1890.19  It 
is headquartered in El Segundo, California.20  Unocal currently employs 
over 6,500 people and conducts expansive operations throughout the 
world.21  These operations are mainly in the area of natural gas extraction 
and transportation, crude oil extraction, and pipeline construction.22  In 
2001, the company enjoyed revenues of 6.8 billion dollars and earnings of 
615 million dollars.23  Unocal first explored the possibility of extraction 
operations in Myanmar in 1990.24  In 1993, it obtained a 28.26% share25 in 
a project run by Total Fina Elf S.A., a Europe based petroleum corpora-
tion.26  The project was centered on extracting gas from the Yadana natural 
  
 19. Unocal Corp., Unocal, All about Unocal, Unocal at a Glance, Around the World 2003 1 
<http://www.unocal.com/aboutucl/uclataglance.pdf> (accessed June 14, 2003) [hereinafter Around the 
World] (also refered to on the web site as Unocal Fact Sheet). 
 20. Id. at 2. 
 21. Id.  Unocal conducts business in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, the Nether-
lands, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, Myanmar, China, and domestically in the Gulf Coast Region, and 
Alaska.  Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Unocal Corp., Unocal, Investor Information, Data Warehouse, 2000-2003 Quarterly Fact Book 
2 <http://www.unocal.com/investor/qfb0003.pdf > (accessed June 27, 2003). 
 24. Id.  For general background see Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883-84 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (Doe I(a));  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178-79 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 25. Unocal Corp., Unocal, All about Unocal, International Energy Operations, Thailand, Thailand 
Fact Sheet, 1 <http://www.unocal.com/globalops/fact_thailand.pdf > (accessed June 27, 2003) [herein-
after Thailand Fact Sheet]. 
 26. Total Fina Elf became Total S.A. in 1995. 
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gas field and transporting it, via pipeline, for power generation in Thai-
land.27   
Unocal has a Corporate Responsibility Program (CRP).28  In 2001, the 
corporation spent six million dollars in worldwide programs to promote 
“sustainable community development,” advance the well being of children, 
and provide educational programs.29  Judging from their investor relations 
web site, it appears some of this money was spent in Myanmar.30  How-
ever, none of the published court decisions relating to this case state that 
Unocal’s CRP was utilized in Myanmar. 
B.  Doe I(a) 
In October 1996, fourteen plaintiffs from the Tenasserim region in 
Burma filed a class action suit against Unocal, based in part on the ATCA, 
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.31  
Other defendants named in this suit were, Total S.A. (Total),32 the Myanma 
Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE),33 the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC),34 Mr. John Imle (Imle),35 and Mr. Roger C. Beach 
(Beach).36  For purposes of this article, the defendants will be referred to as 
“the joint venture,” except where Unocal’s specific role is addressed.  
Throughout Doe, the plaintiffs alleged they were the victims of human 
rights abuses perpetrated by the military government in Myanmar.37  The 
  
 27. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (Doe I(a)).  
 28. Unocal Corp., Unocal, Corporate Responsibility at Unocal < http://www.unocal.com/ 
responsibility/index.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003). 
 29. Around the World, supra n. 19, at 1.  
 30. Unocal Corp., Unocal, Corporate Responsibility at Unocal: 2000-2001 Report, Community 
Involvement and Support, Myanmar <http://www.unocal.com/responsibility/01cr_report/ 
myanmar.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003). 
 31. Doe, 963 F. Supp at 883 (Doe I(a)). The original fourteen plaintiffs were expected to be joined 
by thousands of others.  The plaintiffs were farmers from the above-noted region.  Id. 
 32. Total S.A. is a European petroleum and extraction company.  See e.g. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 
F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178-79 (C.D. Cal.1998).  The district court, in determining it lacked jurisdiction 
over Total, dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit against it.  Id.  In Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 921 (9th 
Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit against Total. 
 33. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (Doe I(a)). 
 34. Id.  SLORC is the ruling body in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma.  Id. 
 35. Id.  Mr. Imle was the president of Unocal.  Id. 
 36. Id.  Mr. Beach was the chairman of Unocal from 1994 until 2001 and the chief executive officer 
(CEO) of Unocal from 1995 until 2001.  Unocal Corp., Unocal, All about Unocal, A History of Unocal, 
<www.unocal.com/aboutucl/history/ index.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003). 
 37. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (Doe I(a)).  Additionally, in September 1996, four villagers from the 
Tenasserim region, the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma and the National Coalition Government 
of the Union of Burma filed suit, titled National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Uno-
cal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997), under the ATCA in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California.  The plaintiffs alleged violations under the law of nations as a basis for 
the ATCA claim, and violations of state law.  Id. at 335. 
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plaintiffs specifically claimed that during a pipeline construction, begun in 
1991, they were subjected to, inter alia, forced labor, torture, murder of 
family members, forced displacement, and rape.38  The pipeline construc-
tion, known as the Yadana project, was designed to ferry natural gas across 
Myanmar for eventual power generation in Thailand.39  The particular alle-
gations were raised under the ATCA as violating the law of nations.40  The 
direct perpetrators of these offenses were state actors from SLORC:  its 
military, intelligence agents, and police.41  However, the plaintiffs alleged 
that because Unocal, Total, Imle, and Beach were jointly engaged with the 
Myanmar government in the pipeline construction, the district court pos-
sessed jurisdiction over the defendants.42  Specifically, the plaintiffs’ con-
tended Unocal and Total contracted with the Myanmar government for use 
of its military to provide security.43  District Court Judge Richard Paez held 
that the district court possessed jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ ATCA 
claims.44 
The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over SLORC 
and MOGE because of their entitlement to sovereign immunity under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).45  Relying on the plain lan-
guage of this act as well as Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,46 the court determined 
SLORC and MOGE’s activity did not fit into one of the commercial activ-
  
 38. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883-85 (Doe I(a)). 
 39. Id. at 883-85. 
 40. Id. at 892. 
 41. Id. at 883. 
 42. Id. at 883-84.  The Plaintiffs also asserted claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), violations of the California Business & Professions Code § 17200, and 
several generic torts such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, negligent 
hiring, and assault.  As to the ATCA claim, the court accepted as fact that in 1991 Unocal and Total 
contracted with the Myanmar government to clear forest, construct road access, and provide security 
for a natural gas pipeline running from the Andaman Sea through the Tenasserim region of Burma and 
into Thailand.  Id. 
 43. Id. at 883. 
 44. Id. at 884.  Other tort claims were dismissed under applicable statutes of limitation.  See id. at 
897. 
 45. Id. at 885.  Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1330, “the [FSIA] provides the sole basis for obtaining 
jurisdiction over a foreign state” in domestic courts.  Id. at 886 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 
U.S. 349, 355, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1476, 123 L. Ed. 2d 47, 58 (1993)).  Generally under the FSIA, a for-
eign state is immune from law suits.  Id. (citations omitted).  However, there are three exceptions to the 
general rule of immunity.  Id.  These exceptions are as follows:  
  
[1] the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the for-
eign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a 
direct effect on the United States[.] 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2003). 
 46. 507 U.S. 349, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 123 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1993). 
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ity exceptions enabling jurisdiction.47  However, despite dismissing 
SLORC and MOGE from the case, the district court determined that they 
were not indispensable parties to the suit.48 
Reviewing principles of jurisdiction under the ATCA, the court first 
determined that official torture rose to the level of a jus cogens norm and 
therefore jurisdiction attached.49  Further, the court held that the plaintiff’s 
allegations constitute state action.50  Namely, Unocal, SLORC, and MOGE 
were “joint venturers, working in concert with one another; and that the 
defendants have conspired to commit the violations of international law . . . 
to further the interests of the Yadana gas pipeline project,” to constitute 
state action.51 In essence, the allegation was sufficient to establish subject-
matter jurisdiction under the ATCA.52  However, the court recognized that 
under some circumstances, such as forced labor, private actors may be 
liable for violations of international law absent state action.53  Thus the 
court did not conduct a state-action analysis for forced labor as it had for 
torture.54 
Unocal also argued for dismissal under the act of state doctrine 
claiming a grant of jurisdiction would “interfere with the foreign policy 
efforts of Congress and the President.”55  The court reaffirmed the act of 
  
 47. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 888 (Doe I(a)). 
 48. Id. at 884.  Indispensable parties are governed by Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.  In order to determine whether a party is indispensable, courts engage in a two step inquiry.  
“First, the court must determine whether the absent party is necessary and cannot be joined.”  Id. at 
889.  If the answer is in the affirmative, “the court must then determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed.”  Id.  In this 
case, Unocal initially argued SLORC and MOGE were entitled to sovereign immunity.  Id. at 884.  In 
prevailing in this argument, Unocal relied upon Aquinda v. Texaco Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996), and then argued for dismissal based on fairness.  See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 889 (Doe I(a)). 
 49. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (Doe I(a)).  A Jus cogens norm is a principle of international law that 
is accepted by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted.  See e.g. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 50. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (Doe I(a)). 
 51. Id. at 891.  State action is essentially defined as “an act under color of law” by a state 
instrumentality.  See e.g. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp, 513 U.S. 374 (1995).  A private 
individual acts under color of law within the meaning of the ATCA when he acts together with state 
officials or with significant state aid.  Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (Doe I(a)). 
 52. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (Doe I(a)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 892.  To establish a claim for some offenses under the ATCA against a private party, the 
plaintiff must prove the defendant engaged under color of state action.  Id. at 891.  It appears there are 
two sequential questions.  The first question arises as to whether the corporate entity’s activities were 
independently commercial, or did the commercial activity assist the criminal actor—in this case, 
SLORC—to the degree that the commercial activity “aided and abetted” the criminal actor.  If the latter 
answer is true—as argued in this article—then the second question involves determining whether the 
“aiding and abetting” extinguishes the act of state doctrine, or if the doctrine remains viable.  Id. at 892. 
 55. Id.  The act of state doctrine is premised on the separation of powers.  Republic of Philippines v. 
Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, 427-28, 84 S. Ct. 923, 940 (1964)).  The Ninth Circuit in Doe I(a) held, “the act of state doctrine 
‘reflects the prudential concern that the courts, if they question the validity of sovereign acts taken by 
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state doctrine principle that, “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the 
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country 
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done 
within its own territory.”56  The district court further held, “[r]edress of 
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means 
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.”57  This 
definition was originally supplied by the Supreme Court in Banco National 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino.58  After a lengthy analysis of the act of state doc-
trine’s applicability in regard to jus cogens violations, the court concluded 
that “the high degree of international consensus,” as to the seriousness of 
the alleged offenses, “severely undermines [Unocal’s] argument that 
SLORC and MOGE’s alleged activities should be treated as acts of 
state.”59   
Finally, the court analyzed Unocal’s remaining fact-based argument 
for dismissal.  Unocal argued that because the plaintiffs did not allege that 
Unocal directly participated in torture or forced labor, but rather accepted 
this labor from SLORC, the case warranted dismissal.60  Moreover, Unocal 
argued that the plaintiffs’ allegations, even if true, merely established a 
business relationship between SLORC and Unocal.61  The court disagreed 
with this argument and found sufficient facts that “plaintiffs could con-
ceivably prove facts to support . . . that Unocal and SLORC have either 
conspired or acted as joint participants to deprive plaintiffs of international 
human rights in order to further their financial interests in the Yadana gas 
  
foreign states, may be interfering with the conduct of American foreign policy by the Executive and 
Congress.’”  Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892-93 (Doe I(a)) (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argen-
tina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 56. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892 (Doe I(a)) (citing Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
423, 84 S. Ct 923, 937-38, 123 L. Ed. 2d 804, 820 (1964) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 
250, 252, 18 S. Ct. 83, 84, 42 L. Ed. 456, 457 (1897))). 
 57. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892 (Doe I(a)). 
 58. 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1964).  In Sabbatino, the Court held “maintaining 
intact the act of state doctrine” serves both the national interest and “progress toward the goal of estab-
lishing the rule of law among nations.”  376 U.S. at 437. 
 59. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 894 (Doe I(a)).  The court further concluded: 
 
[b]ecause nations do not, and cannot under international law, claim a right to torture or en-
slave their own citizens, a finding that a nation has committed such acts, particularly where, 
as here, that finding comports with the prior conclusions of the coordinate branches of gov-




 60. Id. at 896. 
 61. Id. 
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pipeline project.”62  Thus, the court determined the case merited a hearing 
before a trier of fact. 
C.  Doe I(b) 
On October 31, 2001, District Court Judge Ronald Lew, granted Uno-
cal’s motion for summary judgment based on further jurisdictional argu-
ments.63  The court analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims in light of past ATCA 
decisions.64  The court framed its analysis in a two-step process.  First, the 
court had to determine “whether the conduct of the Myanmar military vio-
lated international law.”65  Second, if the first question was answered in the 
affirmative, the court had to assess “whether Unocal [wa]s liable for 
th[o]se violations.”66 
Reviewing the first question, the court held that “[a]ctionable viola-
tions of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and 
obligatory.”67  In other words, the court applied a jus cogens threshold for 
jurisdiction.  Additionally, because Unocal argued that only jus cogens 
violations are actionable under the ATCA, the court distinguished between 
customary international law and jus cogens.68  The court defined customary 
international law as “rest[ing] on the consent of the states.”69  In essence, 
the court held “that those states that do not agree to a norm of customary 
international law are not bound by it.”70  In defining jus cogens as “values 
taken to be fundamental by the international community. . . [that] are bind-
ing on all nations,” the court determined that the ATCA conferred jurisdic-
tion over jus cogens offenses only.71  The court held torture, murder, geno-
cide, and slavery as violations of jus cogens norms.72  The court further 
recognized that the law of nations regarding piracy and slavery has been 
  
 62. Id.  The court further addressed statutes of limitation, equitable tolling, and remaining claims not 
related to the ATCA.  Id. at 896-97. 
 63. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (Doe I(b)). 
 64. Id. at 1303-05.  The court specifically analyzed norms regarding forced labor, relying on reports 
by the International Labor Organization (ILO).  Id. at 1308.  The ILO is the primary agency within the 
United Nations for workers rights.  Id.  In 1996, it specifically reviewed labor practices in Myanmar.  
Id.  Interestingly, Unocal appeared to concede forced labor occurred when it argued before Judge Lew 
that federal law recognizes the right of states to utilize forced labor “for the public good.”  Id. 
 65. Id. at 1303. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 1304 (citations omitted).  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (citing Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715). 
 70. Id. (citing Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715). 
 71. Id. (relying on Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1475). 
 72. Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d, at 1304 (Doe I(b)) (citations omitted). 
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historically applied to private actors, but not torture and summary execu-
tion (murder).73 
However, the court’s analysis of state action liability led it to dismiss 
the plaintiffs’ suit as to the murder and torture claims.74  The court held 
that for jurisdiction over Unocal to attach, its participation in the pipeline 
project had to constitute state action under the joint action test.75  In order 
to satisfy that test, Unocal had to be a “willful participant in joint action 
with [Myanmar] or its agents.”76  Because the plaintiffs presented no direct 
allegation that Unocal conspired, participated in, or influenced SLORC’s 
conduct, the plaintiffs’ suit as to summary execution (murder) and torture 
failed.77  Thus, dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit, the court considered that 
Unocal would have to have been an active participant in order for it to find 
Unocal had aided and abetted the Myanmar military in the asserted interna-
tional law violations, with the exception of forced labor.78 
The court assessed Unocal’s liability as a private actor for forced labor 
and held that the plaintiffs had a burden of establishing Unocal’s legal re-
sponsibility for the Myanmar military’s forced labor activities.79  The court 
also analyzed the plaintiffs’ argument that “knowledge and approval of 
acts is sufficient for a finding of liability” by looking at the post-World 
War II trials of German industrialists.80  However, in some of those trials, 
the tribunals determined knowledge of slave labor usage alone was an in-
sufficient ground for guilt.81  That is, where those defendants could estab-
  
 73. Id. at 1305. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  In order to be liable for certain offenses in violation of the law of nations, the perpetrator 
must be acting under color of state action.  For instance Unocal would not be liable under the ATCA 
for committing an offense such as summary execution.  In that case, a plaintiff would have to seek 
jurisdiction under a different theory of liability.  Under the joint action test, state action is present if a 
private party is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”  Id.  In ATCA cases, the 
“color of law” jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged 
in official action for purposes of jurisdiction.  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1996).  “A 
private individual acts under ‘color of law’ within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together 
with state officials or with significant state aid.”  Id. 
 76. Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305 (Doe I(b)) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S. 
Ct. 183, 186, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185, 189 (1980)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 1309.  (looking to the International Military Tribunals (IMT) conducted against Ger-
man “captains of industry” after World War II). 
 80. Id. at 1309.  There were twelve trials conducted.  Id.  In U.S. v. Flick, four of the defendants 
were entitled to a defense of necessity and were therefore not guilty.  Id. (citing 6 Tr. of War Crim. 
before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1196 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 
1952)).  In U.S. v. Krauch, five of the defendants were found guilty, in part, because “they embraced 
the opportunity to take full advantage of slave labor program.”  Id. at 1310 (citing 8 Tr. of War Crim. 
before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1179 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 
1952) [hereinafter I.G. Farben). 
 81. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-10 (Doe I(b)) (requiring knowledge and participation). 
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lish “necessity,” the burden of proving guilt was considerably higher be-
cause the prosecution then encountered a burden of proving the weakness 
of the necessity defense.82  Likewise, the court held that while there was 
ample evidence that Unocal knew SLORC “employed forced labor,” there 
was no evidence Unocal specifically sought its use.83  In essence, the dis-
trict court found no domestic or international principle of law establishing 
liability for passively participating, or financially benefiting, from slave 
labor.  As a result, no liability attached to Unocal and the court granted 
Unocal summary judgment.84 
D.  Doe II 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
a.  Pertinent Facts in the Decision 
On September 18, 2002, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment to Unocal,85 criticizing both its interpretation 
of international law86 and its jurisdictional analysis.87  In doing so, the 
Ninth Circuit published an extensive factual background to the case.  The 
court first noted that all parties to the suit agreed that the “Myanmar Mili-
tary provided security and other services for the [pipeline construction].”88  
It found there was sufficient evidence to raise “a genuine issue of material 
fact whether the [joint venture] hired the Myanmar Military, and whether 
Unocal knew of this.”89  During earlier depositions, in corporate news re-
leases,90 and at the district court, Unocal disputed that the joint venture 
  
 82. Id. at 1310. 
 83. Id.  The court specifically held: 
  
there are no facts suggesting that Unocal sought to employ forced or slave labor. . . .  The 
evidence does suggest that Unocal knew forced labor was being utilized and that the Joint 
Venturers benefited from the practice.  However, because such a showing is insufficient to 
establish liability under international law, Plaintiff’s claim against Unocal for forced labor 
under the [ATCA] fails as a matter of law. 
 
Id. 
 84. Id.  In this decision, the court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ RICO claims.  Id. at 1311. 
 85. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *55 (Doe II).   
 86. Id. at *36. 
 87. Id. at *37. 
 88. Id. at *6.  The court drew this inference, in part, from a Unocal memorandum documenting that 
corporation’s meetings with Total where the use of Myanmar security was discussed, as well as a 
deposition from a former soldier guarding the project.  Id. 
 89. Id. at *7. 
 90. Unocal Corp., Unocal, Corporate Responsibility, Human Rights and Unocal, Human Rights and 
Economic Engagement <http://www.unocal.com/responsibility/humanrights/hr5.htm> (stating that 
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hired the Myanmar military, and if it did, that Unocal knew about it.91  The 
court, while not ruling on Unocal’s knowledge, called into question the 
veracity of Imle’s and Beach’s denials.92  The court also noted evidence 
indicating that Unocal had the ability to influence the Myanmar military.93  
In short, the court determined that the evidence raised a genuine issue re-
garding Unocal’s relationship to the Myanmar military through their part-
nership in the joint venture.94  
The court then analyzed evidence regarding Unocal’s knowledge of 
human rights abuses.95  It noted several plaintiffs earlier testified that the 
Myanmar Military subjected them to rape, murder, and torture.96  The court 
also noted an abundance of international law reports that catalogued human 
rights abuses, such as forced labor, in Myanmar.97  Additionally, it recog-
nized several instances where human rights organizations provided Unocal 
with information detailing that forced labor occurred at the Yadana pro-
ject.98  The court found it compelling that one of Unocal’s own consultants, 
“a former military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, reported to 
Unocal that ‘the Myanmar Military was, in fact, using forced labor and 
committing other human rights violations in connection with the Pro-
ject.’”99  Finally, the court noted a series of communications between Uno-
cal and Total “reflect[ing] the companies’ shared knowledge that the 
  
 pipeline workers were paid at least a market wage). 
 91. Id. at **7-8. 
 92. Id. at *8.  The court noted that Total briefed Imle and Beach in 1996 on the issues of pipeline 
security and labor wages.  Id. 
 93. Id. at **10-11.  The court noted an e-mail from Unocal’s Director of Information to a company 
spokesman which provided evidence of Unocal’s influence over the Myanmar military.  Id. at *10. 
 94. Id. at *9. 
 95. Id. at *11. 
 96. Id. at *12.  One compelling instance in the evidence relates to “Jane Doe I.”  She testified that 
her husband was shot at by soldiers in an attempt to escape the forced labor program at the construction 
site.  In retaliation for his escape attempt, the soldiers threw her and her baby into a fire, killing the 
baby.  The court also noted other witnesses who testified to observing executions of villagers who 
refused to work as well as those who were too weak to work.  Still other witnesses testified to being 
raped by soldiers.  Id. 
 97. Id. at *13. 
 98. Id.  For example, in 1995, Amnesty International “alerted Unocal to the possibility that the 
Myanmar military might used forced labor in connection with the project.”  Id. 
 99. Id. at *18.  Mr. John Haseman, a former United States Military Attaché to Rangoon specifically 
told Unocal that: 
 
Unocal was particularly discredited when a corporate spokesman was quoted as saying that 
Unocal was satisfied with . . . assurances [by the Myanmar Military] that no human rights 
abuses were occurring in the area of pipeline construction . . . Unocal, by seeming to have 
accepted [the Myanmar Military]’s version of events, appears at best naive and at worst a 
willing partner in the situation. 
 
Id. at **18-19 (brackets in original). 
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Myanmar Military was using forced labor in connection with the Pro-
ject.”100 
b.  The Court’s Legal Analysis 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by determining that the plaintiffs’ 
allegations constituted a violation of the law of nations.101  The court, in 
relying on past precedent, held that torture, murder, and slavery constituted 
jus cogens offenses.102  The court also held that rape can constitute torture, 
and thus embody a jus cogens offense.103  It determined that since the alle-
gations of murder, rape, and torture were committed in furtherance of 
forced labor, the doctrine of state action did not preclude the plaintiffs’ 
claims.104  The court then held “that forced labor is a modern variant of 
slavery.”105  In addition to supporting the view that private actor liability 
extended to the offense of forced labor, the court noted the same held true 
for claims arising under the Thirteenth Amendment.106 
Up to this point, the court below and the Ninth Circuit were in agree-
ment.  While the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court’s decision to 
apply international law as developed by international criminal tribunals,107 
it disagreed with the lower court’s determination that for Unocal to be li-
  
 100. Id. at *19.  The court specifically noted that “on September 17, 1996, Total reported to Unocal 
about a meeting with a European Union civil servant in charge of an investigation of forced labor in 
Myanmar. . . .” Id. at *20.  The civil servant concluded that the forced labor was occurring in relation to 
the project.  Id.  The court also appeared to cast an aspersion on Imle and Unocal’s honesty in deposi-
tions.  For example, the court found that on March 4, 1997: 
 
Unocal nevertheless submitted a statement to the City Counsel of New York, in response to 
a proposed New York City select purchasing law imposed on firms that do business in 
Myanmar, in which Unocal stated that “no [human rights] violations have taken place” in 
the vicinity of the pipeline route. 
 
Id. at **20-21 (brackets in original). 
 101. Id. at *29. 
 102. Id. at **28-29, In relying, in part, on U.S. v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n. 5 (9th Cir. 
1995), the court determined that murder, torture, and slavery were peremptory norms from which no 
derogation is permitted.  Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *28 (Doe II). 
 103. Id. at *28.  The court relied on Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 852, 854, 114 S. Ct 1970, 1987, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 835 (1994) where prison rape was described as 
“the equivalent of” and “nothing less than torture.”  Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *28 (Doe 
II). 
 104. Id. at *31. 
 105. Id. at *32.  In making this determination, the court relied on the language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17, 64 S. Ct. 792, 799, 88 L. Ed. 1095, 1103 (1944).  
Id.  The Thirteenth Amendment reads:  “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist 
within the United States. . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 106. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *33 n. 18 (Doe II). 
 107. Id. at *39. 
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able, its conduct would have to rise to the level of “active participation.”108  
Instead, the court applied the recent international law understanding of 
accomplice liability and defined “aiding and abetting” similar to defini-
tions created by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY)109 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).110  
The plaintiffs contended Unocal was also liable under theories of joint 
venture, agency, negligence, and recklessness.111  However, the court de-
clined to address these claims, because neither the district court nor Unocal 
addressed any of these alternative theories.112  Nonetheless, the court con-
cluded, these alternative theories may also be appropriate to consider.113 
The Ninth Circuit defined the two elements of “aiding and abetting” as 
“knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial ef-
fect on the perpetration of the crime,”114 and “actual or constructive 
‘knowledge . . .  that [the accomplice’s] actions will assist the perpetrator 
in the commission of the crime.’”115  Applying these elements to the facts, 
the court concluded enough evidence existed to establish a prima facie case 
  
 108. Id. at *37.  The Ninth Circuit held the lower court’s use of the “active participation standard” 
occurred because that court misapplied the standards in the German industrialist cases.  The Ninth 
Circuit argued the IMT applied the active participation standard only to overcome the defendant’s 
necessity defenses.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit further held the necessity defense was inapplicable for Uno-
cal.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit also did not limit its sources of international law to tribunals, acknowledg-
ing the scholarship of jurists and other general practices of nations.  Id. 
 109. See e.g. United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, S.C. Res. 827, 48 U.N. SCOR, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing ICTY). For a contextual narrative of the events related to the 
ICTY, see e.g. Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY-94-1 ¶ 689 (May 7, 1997) <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/ 
trialc2/judgement/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.> (accessed June 27, 2003).  On June 25, 1991, Croatia and 
Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia.  Id. at 27 ¶ 77.  The Serbian leader of Yugoslavia, 
Slobodan Milosevic, ordered the army to invade Slovenia.  See id. (Slovenia’s independence chal-
lenged militarily by JNA.).  After European intervention, Milosevic then turned the army toward Croa-
tia.  Id. at 44 ¶ 123.  In January 1992, the United Nations brokered a cease-fire between the two.  Dur-
ing this time, ethnically diverse Bosnia-Herzegovina, another Yugoslav province, declared its inde-
pendence.  Id. at 27 ¶ 78.  Within that province Muslims and Croats found themselves fighting Serbs.  
See id. at 29 ¶ 84.  From 1992 until 1995, Serbian military and paramilitary groups engaged in a pattern 
of human rights abuses that came to be known under the umbrella label, “ethnic cleansing.”  Id. at ¶84.  
It is estimated that over 100,000 persons perished during the fighting.  The ICTY was established in 
1993 to prosecute war crimes such as crimes against humanity and genocide.  Id. at ¶ 2 
 110. See e.g. United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, S.C. Res. 955, 49 U.N. SCOR, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the ICTR); see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judm. 484-
485, 548 (ICTR Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001 
.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003).  Between April to July 1994, between 500,000 and over one million 
persons belonging mostly to a distinct minority group, the Tutsi, were executed by Rwandan govern-
ment forces, their intermediaries, and supporters.  Id. at ¶ 110-111.  Individuals considered by the 
United Nations Security Council (Security Council) to be perpetrators or main participants of crimes 
related to this event were ultimately indicted, and in an ongoing process, brought to trial before an ad 
hoc tribunal specifically created to punish those offenders under international law.  Id. at ¶ 129 . 
 111. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *36 n. 20 (Doe II). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at *36. 
 115. Id. at *47. 
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of forced labor, murder, and rape.116  The court also held that since the 
plaintiffs’ case theory rested on proving the murder, rape, and torture oc-
curred in furtherance of forced labor, state action was not required to give 
rise to liability under the ATCA.117  However, the court affirmed the dis-
missal of the plaintiffs’ suit for torture because other than rape, the plead-
ings did not contain adequate proof of torture.118  Finally, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the Myanmar Military and MOGE 
recognizing that the FSIA precluded jurisdiction119 and dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ RICO claims.120  The court concluded that RICO did not extend 
to ATCA cases.121 
2.  Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s Concurrence 
In his concurrence, Judge Reinhardt agreed with the majority that the 
ATCA conferred jurisdiction to the district court to adjudicate the plaintiffs 
allegations.122  He also agreed with the court’s presentation of facts rele-
vant to its determination.  Additionally, he found that if allegations of 
forced labor were proven, Unocal would be liable under the ATCA.123  
However, Judge Reinhardt disagreed with both the court’s application of 
international law in defining ancillary issues such as accomplice liability, 
and its analysis of jus cogens.124   
In terms of defining liability, Judge Reinhardt concluded that “federal 
common law tort principles, such as agency, joint venture, or reckless dis-
regard,” were the correct means for determining liability.125  In particular, 
he found the court’s application of accomplice liability, defined from the 
ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals, troublesome because their accomplice 
liability definition permits the “imposition of liability for the lending of 
moral support.”126  Judge Reinhardt conceded that Unocal’s liability, in 
terms of choice of law, under the ATCA presented a case of first impres-
sion.127  However, he argued federal common law served as the correct 
  
 116. See id. at *63 (Because Unocal knew that acts of violence were about to occur, it was liable as 
an aider and abettor when those acts occurred.). 
 117. See id.  (liable as an aider and abettor if acts occurred). 
 118. Id. at *63. 
 119. Id. at *79. 
 120. Id. at *83. 
 121. Id. at **81-82. 
 122. Id. at *84. 
 123. Id. at *83. 
 124. Id. at **84-85.  Judge Reinhardt found the court’s analysis of jus cogens interesting from a 
scholarly point of view, but irrelevant to the case.  Id. at *89 n. 2. 
 125. Id. at *85. 
 126. Id. at *84. 
 127. Id. at *90. 
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basis for determining Unocal’s liability as to ancillary issues such as defin-
ing accomplice liability.128  He further argued that common law principles 
are more than adequate for defining accomplice liability because they have 
been applied to similar domestic cases for years.129  Yet, he acknowledged 
that the TVPA, FSIA, and the substantive component of the ATCA obli-
gated the use of international law.130  Judge Reinhardt’s chief concern with 
the application of international law for third-party liability stemmed from 
the ICTY’s and ICTR’s “uncertain and inchoate rule,”131 of liability based 
on “practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support. . . .”132 
Instead, Judge Reinhardt’s inquiry as to choice of law relied, in part, 
on principles set forth by the 1900 case, The Paquete Habana 133 where the 
Supreme Court held that in appropriate circumstances federal common law 
incorporates principles of international law.134  To Judge Reinhardt, these 
factors included:  (1) ease in determining the law to be applied; (2) “cer-
tainty, predictability and uniformity of result;” and, (3) the application of 
well-known legal principles over unsettled international principles of re-
cent origin.135   
As noted above, in applying federal common law to Doe, Judge 
Reinhardt posited three theories of third-party liability.  The first of these 
theories is “joint venture liability.”136  Under this theory, “a member of a 
joint venture is liable for the acts of its co-venturers.”137  Judge Reinhardt 
argued that the joint venture theory is well established in international law 
as well as under domestic law.138  He also argued that agency liability 
could be applied.139  Under this theory, for example, an employer is re-
sponsible for the acts of his or her employees.140  It is up to the jury to de-
termine the existence of an agency relationship mirroring employment or 
other fiduciary responsibility.141  As in the case of joint venture liability, 
  
 128. Id. at *91.  Judge Reinhardt acknowledged that federal courts ordinarily apply federal common 
law in limited circumstances such as when Congress authorizes them to do so.  Id.  However, he argued 
that international relations is one area where federal common law is “frequently applied.”  Id. 
 129. Id. at *95. 
 130. Id. at *96. 
 131. Id. at *105. 
 132. Id. at *105 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998) (reprinted in 38 
I.L.M. 317, ¶ 235 (1999))). 
 133. 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900). 
 134. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *104 (Doe II). 
 135. Id. at **98-99. 
 136. Id. at *107. 
 137. Id. at *107 (citing Davidson v. Enstar Corp., 848 F.2d 574, 577-78 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 138. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at **108-109 (Doe II). 
 139. Id. at *113. 
 140. Id. at *114 (citing Moriarity v. Gluckert Funeral Home, Ltd., 155 F.3d 859, 866 n. 15 (7th Cir. 
1998)). 
 141. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *114 (Doe II). 
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Judge Reinhardt found that agency principles are well established under 
both domestic and international law.142  Finally, Judge Reinhardt found the 
theory of reckless disregard applicable143 and recognized it as a principle in 
both domestic and international law.144 
 
III.  DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPTS AND 
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT PRIOR TO DOE V. UNOCAL CORP.:  THE 
MOVE TOWARD CORPORATE LIABILITY 
As noted above, from 1789 to 1979, few civil actions were pursued 
under the ATCA.  The first successful civil action involving human rights 
violations occurred in the 1979 Filartiga case.145  Cases occurring after 
Filartiga expanded principles set forth in that decision and merit review 
for this paper.  As noted in the introduction, review of prior ATCA deci-
sions prior are necessary to any conduct meaningful analysis of Doe II. 
 
A.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 
In 1979, two Paraguayan citizens, Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter, 
Dolly Filartiga, filed suit in New York District Court under the ATCA 
against another Paraguayan citizen, Americo Norbero Pena-Irala.146  Pena-
Irala had been the Inspector General of Police in the city of Asuncion, 
Paraguay.147  The plaintiffs alleged that on  March 29, 1976, in Asuncion, 
Pena-Irala kidnapped and murdered Dr. Filartiga’s son Joelito Filartiga.148  
This apparently occurred in response to Dr. Filartiga’s political activity 
against the Paraguayan government.149  No component of that murder, in-
  
 142. Id. at *115.  Judge Reinhardt cited to, inter alia, Bazley v. Curry, 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can. 1999) 
(Canadian Supreme Court); the Civil Code of France, Art. 1384 (1984); the Civil Code of Germany § 
831 (1975); and Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Power & Light Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 215 (Bel-
gium v. Spain).  Id. at **115-116. 
 143. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *119 (Doe II). 
 144. Id. at **120-123.  Judge Reinhardt drew attention to, inter alia, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 836, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1978, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 826 (1994) and Youell v. Exxon Corp, 48 F.3d. 
105, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 145. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  Later that day, Dolly Filartiga was escorted to the Pena-Irala  home by the Paraguayan 
police where she saw her brother’s dead and tortured body.  As she fled from the home, Pena-Irala 
followed her shouting, “‘Here you have what you have been looking for so long and what you deserve.  
Now shut up.’”  Id. 
 149. Id. 
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cluding the preparation, had any geographic nexus to the United States.150  
At that time, Paraguay was governed by military dictatorship, and its hu-
man rights reputation was almost universally condemned.151  At the time of 
suit all parties were geographically located in New York.152 
On  May 15, 1979, the district court, in construing that “law of na-
tions” excluded a state’s treatment of its own citizens, dismissed the case 
for lack of jurisdiction.153  On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed.154  The court, relying on the Supreme Court case, U.S. v. Smith155 
reiterated “the law of nations ‘may be ascertained by consulting the works 
of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and 
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that 
law.’”156  That the Second Circuit recognized that in interpreting interna-
tional law, evolving standards and theoretical arguments played a role is 
significant.  This is because international law is often not codified.157  The 
Second Circuit, in its reversal of the lower court, refused to be locked into 
a narrow definitional interpretation of the ATCA’s law of nations element, 
and gave recognition to the evolving standards of international law.  The 
court specifically held that to determine the standard of international law 
offenses in violation of the laws of nations  a court must look to the law’s 
current form rather than the form of the law in 1789.158  Some of the 
court’s recognition was based on the fact that the United Nations Charter 
“makes it clear that . . . a state’s treatment of its own citizens is a matter of 
  
 150. See id. (kidnapped, tortured, and murdered in Paraguay). 
 151. Id.  Paraguay was governed under the administration of Alfredo Stroessner who had been in 
power since 1954.  Id. at 878. 
 152. Id.  Dolly Filartiga entered the United States in 1978.  Id.  Pena-Irala entered the United States in 
1978, but by the time he was served with his court summons, he was awaiting deportation for overstay-
ing his visa.  Id. at 879. 
 153. Id. at 880.  The district court, in making this decision, relied on  von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 
1975) and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).  Id.  Two days after dismissing its case, 
Pena-Irala returned to Paraguay.  Id. 
 154. Id. at 878. 
 155. 18 U.S. 153, 160, 5 L. Ed. 57 (1820). 
 156. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61, 5 L. Ed. 57, 58-59 
(1820)). 
 157. Id.  See e.g. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S.Ct 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900), where the 
Court held: 
 
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, 
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, 
to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, 
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat . . . . 
 
Id. at 880-881. 
 158. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
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international concern.”159  Additionally, the Second Circuit found support 
in the Declaration of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture.160  
Having accepted torture as a violation of the law of nations,161 the Sec-
ond Circuit then was confronted by an issue of geographic nexus.  The 
torture occurred in Paraguay.162  However, the court held, “[c]ommon law 
courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate transitory tort claims 
between individuals over whom they exercise personal jurisdiction, wher-
ever the tort occurred.”163  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded the ATCA 
opened the federal courts for adjudication of rights already recognized by 
international law.164  In doing so, as discussed below, the Second Circuit 
created a narrow but universal jurisdiction for civil tort actions based on 
the law of nations.  Finally, the Second Circuit provided philosophical 
guidance for its reasoning: 
In the twentieth century the international community has come to 
recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of 
basic human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture . . 
. .  In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations 
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that 
respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and col-
lective interest . . . .  Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the tor-
turer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis 
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.  Our holding today, giv-
ing effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Con-
gress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless 
dream to free all people from brutal violence.165 
Although Filartiga was not granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, 
principles established in that case appear to have been given credence by 
the Court.  In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,166 the 
Court held that Argentina could not be liable under the ATCA because the 
Court determined the FSIA was the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction 
over sitting foreign governments.167 Amerada involved a suit under the 
  
 159. Id. at 881. 
 160. Id. at 882 (citing G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. 
A/1034 (1975)). 
 161. Id. at 884.  
 162. See id. at 878. 
 163. 630 F.2d at 885.  To prove the long-standing acceptance of transitory nature of tort, the Second 
Circuit  relied on McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. 241, 11 L. Ed. 117 (1843).  Id. 
 164. 630 F.2d at 887. 
 165. Id. at 890. 
 166. 488 U.S. 428, 109 S. Ct. 683, 102 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1989) [hereinafter Amerada]. 
 167. Amerada, 488 U.S. at 438-39. 
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ATCA against Argentina for that country’s damaging of a neutral ship 
during the Falklands War against the United Kingdom.168 In a sense, while 
the Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision to attach liability to Ar-
gentina, under the ATCA, it never repudiated the jurisdictional and inter-
pretive principles set in Filartiga.  To date, Filartiga remains compelling 
law, and in all but one case, has its holding been rejected or modified into a 
narrower jurisdictional interpretation.169  Additionally, in 1992 Congress 
appeared to accept the Filartiga holding by passing the TVPA. 
B.  Marcos I and Kadic v. Karadzic: The Movement toward Corporate 
Liability under the ATCA. 
Filartiga, as noted above, involved a lawsuit by an individual against a 
former government actor for human rights abuses violating the law of na-
  
 168. Amerada, 488 U.S. at 432.  As a result of the damage, the owners scuttled the ship.  Amerada, 
488 U.S. at 432.  In April of 1982, Argentine Forces invaded the Falkland Islands Group then belong-
ing to Great Britain.  See generally Thomas M. Frank, Dulce es Decorum est:  The Strategic Role of 
Legal Principles during the Falklands War, 77 Am. J. Intl. L. 109 (1983).  In response, British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher obtained the support of the United Nations Security Council, the United 
States Government, and the European Community to launch a military reconquest of the island group.  
Id.  This war involved fighting between the maritime, land, and air forces of Great Britain and Argen-
tina.  Id.   
 169. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, dismissed a plaintiff’s suit against the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Libya for a 
terrorist act in Israel.  726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Judge Bork, in his concurrence, held the ATCA 
only extends to torts that would have violated the law of nations in 1789 such as piracy.  Id. at 814, cert 
denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S. Ct. 1354, 84 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1985).  Interestingly, Judge Bork’s concur-
rence appears to run afoul of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.  This reads, in pertinent 
part:  
 
Universal Jurisdiction to Define and Punish Certain Offenses.  A state has jurisdiction to de-
fine and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations 
as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, geno-
cide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism . . . . 
 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 (1987).   
 
In the Restatement’s comment section, there is discussion on permitting a state to expand the class of 
offenses.  This section reads: 
 
[I]nternational law permits any state to apply its laws to punish certain offenses although the 
state has no links of territory with the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or even 
the victim).  Universal jurisdiction over the specified offenses is a result of universal con-
demnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them, as re-
flected in widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of international organi-
zations.  These offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law.  
Universal jurisdiction for additional offenses is provided by international agreements, but it 
remains to be determined whether universal jurisdiction over a particular offense has be-
come customary law for states not party to such an agreement.  
 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 cmt. a (1987). 
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tions.  After Filartiga, jurisdiction over public individuals and foreign gov-
ernments continued to be a focus of concern.  However, later decisions 
eventually provided parameters that could be used in suits against private 
corporations.  
The first important post-Filartiga case establishing eventual parame-
ters for corporate liability was In re:  Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Hu-
man Rights Litigation170 (Marcos I).  This case involved a plaintiff’s suit 
against the estate of former Philippine dictator, Ferdinand Marcos.171  
While much of the Ninth Circuit’s decision dealt with suits barred under 
the FSIA, the court provided expansive jurisdictional parameters for cases 
under the ATCA.  In Marcos I, the Ninth Circuit held that the ATCA 
places no limitations as to the citizenship of the defendant as well as the 
locus of the injury.172  Two years after Marcos I, the Ninth Circuit in Mar-
cos II173 revisited jurisdictional principles set in the initial case to address 
ongoing litigation concerning the Marcos estate.  In Marcos II, the Ninth 
Circuit further held extraterritorial application of the ATCA did not violate 
international law.174 
In the 1995 case, Kadic v. Karadzic,175 the Second Circuit found that 
international law norms apply to private actors who “act in concert with a 
state.”176  The court reasoned that certain forms of conduct violate the law 
of nations whether undertaken by a state or by a private actor.177  The court 
further held the example of the prohibition against piracy applies both to 
states and to private actors.178  Kadic involved a lawsuit under the ATCA 
against Radovan Karadzic, the head of an unrecognized Bosnian-Serb re-
gime who committed human rights violations against several private vic-
  
 170. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Marcos I]. 
 171. See 978 F.2d at 495-496.  In Marcos I, the plaintiff, Agapita Trajano, filed suit against the estate 
of Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc.  Id. at 496.  In 1977, Agapita Trajano’s 
son, Archimedes, during an open university forum, asked Imee Marcos-Manotoc questions regarding 
her appointment as a director of an organization.  Id. at 495.  Shortly after this forum, Archimedes 
Trajano was abducted, interrogated, and tortured to death by military intelligence personnel.  Id. at 496.  
These personnel were under the control of Imee Marcos-Manotoc.  Id. 
In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc, and other political officials left the Philippines and 
resided in Hawaii.  In March of that year, Agapita Trajano filed suit under the ATCA against Imee 
Marcos Manotoc for false imprisonment, kidnapping, wrongful death, and deprivation of rights.  De-
spite appropriate service and knowledge of the proceedings, Imee Marcos-Manotoc failed to appear at 
court and default judgment was entered against her.  The court then awarded Agapita Trajano $4.16 
million in damages and attorneys fees.  Imee Marcos-Manotoc then appealed this verdict.  Id. 
 172. Id. at 500. 
 173. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).  Marcos II involved challenging a court injunction against the 
Marcos Estate from moving its assets outside of the United States.  Id. at 1468. 
 174. Id. at 1475. 
 175. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 176. Id. at 245. 
 177. Id. at 239. 
 178. Id. 
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tims.179  Yet, Karadzic was a direct—albeit private—actor in human rights 
abuses.180  Corporations seldom are direct actors in human rights abuses in 
ATCA claims.181   
C.  Concurrent Corporate Liability Cases 
As a result of Kadic, Doe II involved no radical expansion of the prin-
ciple under which private, non-state entities, including corporations, can be 
liable under the ATCA.  Indeed, Doe was not the first case involving a 
corporation to go before either a district court or a circuit court.182  How-
ever, for reasons discussed below, the Ninth Circuit was confronted by first 
impression issues of law and gave greater recognition to the use of interna-
tional law not reached by other courts addressing the ATCA. 
As Doe worked its way through the district and the appellate courts, 
several other ATCA cases involving corporations, mainly engaged in 
extraction enterprises, were also brought before the district and the circuit 
courts.  However, most of these cases were disposed of without any analy-
sis of issues central to adjudicating claims under the ATCA such as defin-
ing accomplice liability, establishing what torts could be construed as vio-
lating the law of nations, and establishing what, if any, defenses were 
available to corporations.  For instance, in one of the cases predating Doe 
II, Aguinda v. Texaco183, allegations of widespread environmental destruc-
tion and of health problems stemming from Texaco’s activities were dis-
missed by the District Court for the Southern District of New York under 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.184  The Second Circuit upheld this 
decision.185  Likewise, in Jota v. Texaco,186 an earlier companion case to 
Aguinda, the Second Circuit decided not to fully determine whether wide-
  
 179. Id. at 237.  The victims in Kadic were Croat Muslims who were, along with family members, 
subjected to rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution.  These 
degradations were carried out by Bosnian Serb forces, “as part of a genocidal campaign conducted 
during the course of the Bosnian civil war.”  Id. 
 180. See id. at 239 (Karadzic asserted contradictory positions that he was a private individual and a 
head of state.). 
 181. See e.g. Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon - An Examina-
tion of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 Berke-
ley J. Intl. L. 91, 101 (2002).  In this article, Ramasastry provides three well-defined typologies of 
corporate complicity.  These are “(1) direct complicity, (2) indirect complicity, and, (3) mere presence 
in a country, coupled with silence or inaction.”  Id. at 100.  Ramasastry argues convincingly that Uno-
cal’s activities in Myanmar fit into the second category of indirect complicity.  Id. at 102-03. 
 182. See e.g. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalization of Domestic Law, in The Alien Tort 
Claims Act:  An Analytical Anthology 9 (Ralph Steinhardt and Anthony D’Amato, eds., Transnatl. 
Publishers, 1999). 
 183. 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 184. 303 F.3d 470, 476 (2002). 
 185. Id. at 480. 
 186. 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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spread environmental degradations violated the law of nations187 and 
remanded the case under the indispensable parties rule.188 
In the Second Circuit case, Bano v. Union Carbide Corp.,189 plaintiffs 
sued Union Carbide for violations under the ATCA for claims stemming 
from the Bhopal, India disaster.190  However, because the Indian Govern-
ment previously settled all claims on behalf of the victims, the plaintiffs 
were precluded from bringing suit in the United States.191  Prior to Bano, 
the Second Circuit addressed corporate liability in Bigio v. Coca-Cola 
Co.192  In that case, the court determined that a current lease of property 
from Egypt, which had been previously confiscated by the Egyptian gov-
ernment, based on the original owner’s religion, did not violate a universal 
norm of international law.193  In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,194 the 
Fifth Circuit held that a private corporation could be held liable for geno-
cide.195  However, the plaintiffs in that case failed to allege facts that con-
stituted genocide and the case was dismissed.196 
At the district courts, several ATCA cases involving corporate defen-
dants were occurring as well.  For example, on September 16, 2002, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Ab-
dullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 197 dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, finding Nigeria the appropriate jurisdiction.198  However, 
  
 187. Id. at 159. 
 188. Id. at 163. 
 189. 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 190.  Id. at 124.  On  December 2-3, 1984, a Union carbide chemical plant in the city of Bhopal, India 
leaked poisonous gas into “densely populated neighborhoods.”  Id. at 122.  Thousands of people were 
killed and hundreds of thousands were injured.  Id. 
 191. Id. at 128-130. 
 192. 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 193. Id. at 449. 
 194. 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 195. See id. at 167-68 (observing that plaintiff’s complaint could have be amended to allege geno-
cide). 
 196. Id. at 167-68.  Beanal’s argument was premised on a claim of cultural genocide.  Id. at 167.  
Beanal also argued Freeport engaged in widespread environmental degradations.  Id. at 166.  However, 
the court dismissed this complaint for failing to state a claim under the ATCA.  Id. at 166-67. 
 197. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436 ( S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2002). 
 198. Id. at *38.  In Abdullahi, a class of plaintiffs alleged Pfizer, a United States-based pharmaceuti-
cal company, administered an experimental antibiotic, Trovan, in Nigeria without their consent.  Id. at 
*8.  As a result of Pfizer’s actions, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered “grave injuries,” including child 
paralysis, blindness, and death.  Id. at *6  The drug used had not yet gained FDA approval during the 
period it was administered in Nigeria.  Id. 
According to the district court,  
 
[I]n January 1999, the FDA recommended that Trovan be prescribed only for patients in 
nursing homes or hospitals suffering from life threatening conditions. That following June, 
the FDA issued a public health advisory on liver toxicity associated with oral and intrave-
nous Trovan following post-marketing reports of acute liver failure strongly associated with 
the drug. The FDA announced that it received reports of more than one-hundred cases 
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the court did find that Pfizer’s distribution of experimental drugs that re-
sulted in injury and death could be actionable under the ATCA.199 Like-
wise, the same district court on July 16, 2002, in Flores v. S. Peru Copper 
Corp.,200 held that environmental degradations do not constitute violations 
of universally recognized norms and dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit.201  Fi-
nally, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC,202 plaintiffs alleged they were victims of 
human rights abuses from a British and an Australian mining corpora-
tion.203  The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia held that while plaintiffs’ allegations of torture constituted actionable 
claims, the case was dismissed on the political question doctrine.204  In 
Eastman Kodak v. Kavlin,205 the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida held where a corporation conspires with a govern-
ment to deprive a plaintiff of basic civil rights, such as by false imprison-
ment, the ATCA confers jurisdiction.206  Although, Kavlin did not address 
choice of law issues, it provided further analysis as to the expanse of the 
  
where Trovan patients exhibited clinically symptomatic liver toxicity and advised physi-
cians to use Trovan only for patients who met certain criteria. In addition, Pfizer agreed to 
limit distribution of Trovan to hospitals and long-term nursing facilities. Further, the Euro-
pean Union’s Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products suspended all sales of Trovan 
in part due to results from the [Nigeria] tests. 
 
Id. at *7-8 (citations omitted). 
 199. See id. at *10-*18. 
 200. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13013 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002) (This case was decided on July 16, 
2002, and was unlikely to have any impact on Doe II.). 
 201. Id. at *31. In Flores, the court relied, in part, on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law.  Id.  The court’s specific language bears important note to future ATCA cases alleging environ-
mental degradations. 
 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987) supports the position that environmental 
pollution, within a nation’s borders, that adversely affects human life or health does not violate any 
binding rules of international law. Section 601 describes a state’s responsibilities with respect to the 
environment as follows:  
 
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable 
under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control  
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for the prevention, re-
duction, and control of injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction; and (b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the 
environment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . . . 
 
Id. at *31-32. 
 202. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 203. Id. at 1120-21. 
 204. Id. at 1208-09.  
 205. 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
 206. Id. at 1094.  The district court in this case created language that applies to corporate liability, 
holding:  “it would be a strange tort system that imposed liability on state actors but not on those who 
conspired with them to perpetrate illegal acts through the coercive use of state power.”  Id. at 1091. 
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ATCA’s jurisdiction.207  The court, while noting the Supreme Court has yet 
to provide an interpretation as to the ATCA’s use, also provided guidance 
in recognizing a conspiracy liability of corporations for human rights 
abuses.208  
None of these cases addressed the choice of law to be employed by the 
court.  Thus, in deciding Doe II, the Ninth Circuit was forced to review the 
case, in part, as one of first impression.209  
IV.  HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD OF MYANMAR PRIOR TO AND DURING 
UNOCAL’S COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
Although Unocal first began negotiating with Myanmar around 
1991,210 it wasn’t until 1993 that Unocal formally entered into the joint 
venture with Total and MOGE.211  Even prior to 1993, Myanmar possessed 
one of the worst human rights records in the world.212  From 1990 on, gov-
ernment rule was characterized by summary execution; torture; arbitrary 
arrest; suppression of freedom of opinion, assembly, and association; and 
forced labor.213  Myanmar repeatedly denied allegations of human rights 
abuses to United Nations officials.214  However, the wealth of evidence 
provided by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) mutes the government’s denials.  “In 1989, [both] the [United 
States] Senate and House [of Representatives] passed concurrent resolu-
tions condemning human rights violations in [Myanmar].”215  On July 22, 
1991, President George H.W. Bush implemented economic sanctions 
against SLORC in response to continued human rights abuses.216 
According to the district court in Doe I(b), Unocal executives were 
provided with information detailing human rights abuses specific to the 
  
 207. Id. at 1090-94. 
 208. Id. at 1090. 
 209. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *90 (Doe II). 
 210. See, 963 F. Supp. at 884 (Doe I(a)) (plaintiffs allege Unocal initiated negotiations during or 
before 1991.). 
 211. Id. at 885. 
 212. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs for the House Committee on 
International Relations, 102nd Cong. (1995) (prepared testimony of Holly Burkhalter, Washington 
Director of the Human Rights Watch on Human Rights in Burma) (reprinted in Fed. News Serv., Sept. 
7, 1995). 
 213. E.g. United Nations Interim Report, Situation of Human Right in Myanmar, U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights, Agenda Item 110(c), at ¶ 4(c), U.N. Doc. A/51/466 (1996) [hereinafter U.N. Interim 
Report]; Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Burma (Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights Feb. 1992) 
[hereinafter LCHR]. 
 214. U.N. Interim Report, supra n. 213, at ¶¶ 130-31. 
 215. S. Con. Res. 61, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H. Con. Res. 185, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); 
135 Cong. Rec. S10, 165 (daily ed. Aug 4, 1989); LCHR, supra n. 213, at 37. 
 216. LCHR, supra n. 213 at 43. 
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Yadana project.217  For example, Human Rights Watch representatives met 
with Unocal officials in 1995 and detailed several human rights problem 
areas relating to the pipeline.218  Equally telling, Unocal employees and 
consultants expressed concern with human rights abuses occurring in con-
junction with the Yadana project.219  And on January 4, 1995 during a 
meeting between concerned NGO groups and Imle, the latter apparently 
acquiesced his knowledge of forced labor.220  Finally, Total officials shared 
information on forced labor with Unocal.221  Clearly, both SLORC’s repu-
tation and flow of reports to Unocal provided notice of probable human 
rights abuses in connection with the Yadana project. 
V.  ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Having established that Doe II represents a case of first impression, it 
must first be determined whether the Ninth Circuit correctly applied inter-
national law in addressing whether the plaintiffs’ allegations stated a claim.  
If the plaintiffs’ properly stated a claim, then, was the Ninth Circuit correct 
in expanding a concept of universal jurisdiction for torts into federal com-
mon law when it chose to apply international law over existing federal 
common law?  If the court was correct and fair in its determination, the 
final task is to consider what the foreseeable effects are on legal defenses 
for corporate defendants.   
A.  Matching the Alleged Torts to International Law:  Universal Prohibi-
tions 
One means for determining whether an act or crime violates interna-
tional law is to view the act through jus cogens.  “[A] jus cogens norm is a 
principle of international law that is ‘accepted by the international commu-
nity of States as a whole. . . .’”222  Moreover, it represents “‘a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted. . . .’”223  The D.C. Circuit Court in 
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany224 held: 
  
 217. Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1299-1300 (Doe I(b)). 
 218. Id. at 1299. 
 219. Id. at 1299, 1310. 
 220. Id. at 1300.  In response to questioning, Imle replied: “Let’s be reasonable about this.  What I’m 
saying is that if you threaten the pipeline there’s gonna be more military.  If forced labor goes hand and 
glove with the military yes there will be forced labor.”  Id.  
 221. Id. at 1302. 
 222. E.g. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (1994) (citations omitted). 
 223. Id. (citations omitted). 
 224. 26 F.3d 1166. 
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a state violates jus cogens, as currently defined, if it[ ] “practices, 
encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, 
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) tor-
ture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial dis-
crimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights.”225 
In simpler language, the Ninth Circuit, in Marcos I226 noted, “for a 
court to determine whether a plaintiff has a claim for a tort committed in 
violation of international law, it must decide whether there is an applicable 
norm of international law . . . and whether it was violated in the particular 
case.”227 
Several treaties and conventions detail and define human rights viola-
tions.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)228 is perhaps the best starting point for this determination.  This 
convention guarantees individuals, among other rights, the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience,229 and movement.230  The International Covenant 
on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR)231 also provides guidance because 
it suggests slave labor is a human rights violation.232  Although the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is not binding law, it too em-
bodies aspirational principles of human rights.233  For instance, it proclaims 
a right for fair wages and reasonable periods of rest.234  Likewise, the later 
conventions such as the Torture Convention235 and Genocide Convention236 
  
 225. Id. (quoting the Restatemnent (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §702, cmt. n (1987)). 
 226. 978 F.2d 493 (1992). 
 227. 978 F.2d at 502. 
 228. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 229. Id. at art. 18. 
 230. Id. at art. 12. 
 231. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
 232. Id. at art. 7.  Article 7 reads, in pertinent part: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and 
favorable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular: 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: 
(i) fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value… 
(b) safe and healthy working conditions[.] 
 
Id. 
 233. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71,U.N. 
Doc A/810, (1948).  
 234. Id. 
 235. The Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (1984), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Annex, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51.   
File: Kast (Macro) Final 8-21 Created on:  8/22/2003 2:50 PM Last Printed: 8/22/2003 2:50 PM 
160 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 1, No. 3/4 
assist any determination of what constitutes a recognized violation.  Addi-
tionally, there are three regional agreements capable of providing guid-
ance:  The Inter-American Treaty on Human Rights,237 The European 
Charter on Human Rights,238 and The African Convention on Human 
Rights.239 
Prior ATCA case law also provides some guidance as to what other-
wise tortious action does or does not violate recognized international hu-
man rights law for civil action purposes.  For example, certain tortious 
interference with commercial activity, such as unregulated or unlawful 
picketing, does not provide a basis for suit.240  Additionally, tortious con-
version of personal property does not provide a basis for suit.241  Nor can 
libel provide a basis for suit.242  Thus the basis for any civil action filed 
under the ATCA is that the alleged tort must constitute a violation of the 
law of nations. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Doe II, reiterated that one threshold question in 
any ATCA case is whether the alleged tort is a violation of the law of na-
tions.243  The court further recognized that torture, murder, and slavery are 
jus cogens violations, and thus violations of the law of nations.244  Addi-
tionally, the court accepted that rape can be a form of torture.245  This sec-
tion analyzes whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in its determination as 
  
 236. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948), 78 
U.N.T.S. 277, 280. 
 237. (Nov 22, 1967), 9 I.L.M. 673.  Article 6 reads, in pertinent part:  “1. No one shall be subject to 
slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms, as are the slave trade and 
traffic in women . . . .”  Id. 
 238. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (Nov 4, 1950), 312 U.N.T.S 221 
(codified at 2000/C 364/01 <http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf> (accessed June 27, 
2003)).  Article 5 specifically prohibits slavery, forced or compulsory labor, and human trafficking.  
Article 31 is also helpful in providing a recognized norm.  It reads:  “1.  Every worker has the right to 
working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity.  2.  Every worker has the right 
to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of 
paid leave.”  Id. 
 239. Banjul Charter of June 27, 1981, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), 21 I.L.M. 58.  Article 5 
reads: 
 
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of dignity inherent in a human being and 
to the recognition of his legal status.  All forms of exploitation and degradation of man par-
ticularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment 
shall be prohibited. 
 
Id. 
 240. E.g. Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers’ Intl. Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 241. E.g. Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1981).  
 242. E.g. Akbar v. N. Y. Mag. Co., 490 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 243. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *28. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing rape as torture)). 
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to whether the plaintiffs allegations, if true, established offenses of a jus 
cogens nature. 
1.  Forced Labor 
Freedom from slavery is universally recognized as a basic human 
right.246  The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ex-
pressly prohibits slavery in all forms but penal.247  Moreover, as noted 
above, slavery is outlawed in a number of international agreements and 
conventions.  Additionally, several post-World War II tribunals recognized 
forced labor as a war crime.248  Domestic courts have held forced labor is 
the modern variant of slavery.249  There are several domestic and interna-
tional precedents defining the prohibition against slavery, or its modern 
variant, forced labor.  For example, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,250 held that 
slave trading constituted a crime in violation of the law of nations.251  In-
deed, Judge Edwards in a concurring opinion posited that “while most 
crimes require state action for ATCA liability to attach, there are ‘a hand-
ful of crimes’, including slave trading, ‘to which the law of nations attrib-
utes individual liability,’ such that state action is not required.”252  Thus, 
the issue of forced labor is so serious as to warrant private liability.  For 
these reasons, the Ninth Circuit in Doe II held forced labor rose to a jus 
cogens violation.253   
Forced labor rarely occurs in a vacuum.  That is, forced labor is gener-
ally part of a larger program of subjugation.  In Doe II, forced labor alleg-
edly occurred as a result of the Myanmar Military using a campaign of 
violence to create a labor pool.254  This allegation is similar to the use of 
  
 246. See ICCPR, Supra n. 228, at art. 8.  This article reads in pertinent part:  “1.  No one shall be held 
in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.  2. No one shall be held in 
servitude . . . . ”  Id.  
 247. The Thirteenth Amendment reads:  “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIII.  The Court, in Pollock v. 
Williams, held, “the undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment . . . was not merely to end slavery but 
to maintain a system  of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States.”  322 U.S. 
4, 17, 64 S. Ct. 792, 799, 88 L. Ed. 1095, 1103 (1944). 
 248. See e.g. Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists:  The “Other 
Schindlers,” 9 Temp. Intl. & Comp. L.J. 173, 184, 244 (1995) (Nuremberg Tribunals). 
 249. See e.g. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Lab. Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 250. 726 F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 251. Id. 
 252. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *30. (citing Oren, 726 F.2d at 794-95 (Edwards, J. concurring) 
(emphasis added)). 
 253. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *29. 
 254. Id. at *11. 
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forced labor in World War II by both Germany and Japan.  Indeed, the post 
World War II tribunals against industrialists specifically addressing forced 
labor provided the Ninth Circuit with some guidance.255  After World War 
II, a group of German industrialists was prosecuted by the United States 
and its allies Britain and France.256  For example, in 1948, a tribunal for the 
French military occupation government indicted directors of the Roechling 
Company for crimes against the peace and war crimes.257  Although acquit-
ted of several charges, the chairman of the company, Herman Roechling 
was convicted of participating in the deportation of over 200,000 persons 
from occupied territories into iron and munitions factories.258  While 
Roechling did not personally order the deportation to his plants, the de-
ported individuals worked in his plants with both his knowledge and en-
couragement.259  Additionally, Roechling executives tolerated the use of a 
Gestapo disciplinary court and punishment camp.260  That Roechling man-
agers did not conduct any punishment of workers themselves did not ne-
gate their responsibility.261  Likewise in I.G. Farben, Chairman Carl 
Krauch and four other defendant’s were indicted, in part, for slave labor.262  
At trial, Krauch and the others attempted to use a defense of ignorance.263  
However, the prosecution successfully argued the I.G. Farben executives 
had a fiduciary duty to know the working conditions of their plants.264  
Generally, the tribunals permitted a defense of necessity in cases where 
refusal to comply with Nazi slave order directives would result in drastic 
retaliation.265  However, this defense was not available to defendants who 
voluntarily sought slave labor.266  Such was the case at I.G. Farben where 
managers actively sought slave labor.267  Likewise, in the case of U.S. v. 
  
 255. See e.g id. at *38 n. 22, *42. 
 256. See e.g. Lippman, supra n. 248, at 181-86. 
 257. See The Roechling Case, in 14 Tr. of War Crim. before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control 
Council Law No. 10 1097 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1950).  Five of the Judges on the tribunal were 
French, one was Dutch, and one Belgian.  Lippman, supra n. 248, at 182 n. 87. 
 258. Lippman, supra n. 248, at 182-83 (citing The Roechling Case, in 14 Tr. of War Crim. before the 
Nuremburg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1061 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1950)). 
 259. Lippman supra n. 248, at 182-83. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 184-85. 
 262. Id. at 206. 
 263. Id. at 220. 
 264. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at.*37 (Doe II).  
 265. Id. 
 266. 9 Tr. of War Crim. before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1436 
(U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1950). 
 267. Lippman, supra n. 248, at 216-19 (citing Letter from Def. Krauch to Kehrl, Jan. 13, 1944, in 7 
Tr. of War Crim. before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1081 (U.S. Govt. 
Printing Off. 1950)). 
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Krupp, the Tribunal denied the defendants a necessity defense, because the 
defendants had “taken the initiative in [procuring slave] labor.”268  
Of course, the IMT cases dealt with criminal law jurisdiction where the 
defendants faced death or lengthy imprisonment.  As noted below, suits 
arising under the ATCA are civil and the damages are pecuniary.  Assum-
ing that criminal law defenses, such as necessity, are applicable in ATCA 
cases, the standard for determining the admissibility of that defense would 
be exceedingly high from an evidentiary point.  Even the potential loss of 
assets and investments would not provide the basis for a defense of neces-
sity.  Certainly, a grant of summary judgment could not be based on corpo-
rate necessity. 
In Doe II, there is no evidence, or even argument, that Unocal was 
forced into the Yadana Pipeline Project.  Likewise, there is ample evidence 
the Myanmar Military used forced labor to aid in the construction of the 
pipeline. 269 As noted earlier, Unocal owned a 28.26% share270 in the pro-
ject and sought to financially benefit from its use.  These three facts are 
explain why the Ninth Circuit was correct in its denial to Unocal of the 
necessity defense.  In Section II, this article noted both the district court 
and the appellate court found some evidence of Unocal’s knowledge of 
conditions on the project.  Under the Roechling, I.G. Farben, and Krupp 
standards, there is a prima facie case of Unocal’s liability in “aiding and 
abetting” forced labor under the Ninth Circuit’s definition of the accom-
plice liability elements.  Whether or not the “aiding and abetting” standard 
is correct is addressed below in parts (b) and (c) of Section V.  However, 
because of the universal consensus against forced labor, and the standards 
set under domestic and international law, there is nothing inherently 
wrong, or even slightly flawed, in the Ninth Circuit’s forced labor analysis. 
 
2.  Rape as a Component of Torture 
The argument that torture constitutes a jus cogens offense has been ac-
cepted by several courts.271  But is rape a form of torture?  The Supreme 
Court, in Farmer v. Brennan, 272 settled the issue of including rape within 
the ambit of torture in an Eighth Amendment context.273  In Farmer, a 
  
 268. Lippman, supra n. 248, at 248. 
 269. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at.*51 (Doe II). 
 270. Thailand Fact Sheet, supra n. 25. 
 271. See e.g. Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 
887. 
 272. 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). 
 273. 511 U.S. at 854 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
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transsexual federal inmate was raped by fellow inmates despite prison offi-
cials’ alleged knowledge of the danger that the prison’s general population 
posed to the victim.274  The court held that deliberate indifference by prison 
officials could constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.275  This is the 
clearest domestic example of including rape within torture. 
Rape, in the international community has been considered a compo-
nent of other crimes such as genocide and torture.  For example, the ICTY 
case, Prosecutor v. Akayesu276 addressed the crime of rape in the context of 
it falling under the aegis of another crime such as genocide.  Akayesu was 
the first international tribunal to convict an accused for rape.  Some legal 
scholars note the Akayesu decision is historic because it is the first case to 
link sexual violence to genocide and crimes against humanity.277  This ar-
gument may be overblown as Akayesu did not object to the inclusion of 
rape under the charged offenses as a legal matter.  Yet, there is some sig-
nificance in the tribunal’s inclusion of rape as part of the genocide and 
crimes against humanity charges.  Specifically, Akayesu was accused of 
knowing that the acts of sexual violence and other crimes were being 
committed and of being present at times during their commission.  He was 
further accused of having “facilitated the commission of sexual violence, 
beatings and murders by allowing the sexual violence . . . to occur on or 
near the Taba bureau communal premises.”278  The tribunal held, sexual 
violence crimes, i.e., rape: 
constitute genocide in the same way as any other act, as long as 
they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a particular group, targeted as such.  Indeed, rape and 
sexual violence certainly constitute . . . one of the worst ways of 
inflicting [sic] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily 
and mental harm. . . .  Sexual violence was an integral part of the 
process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and spe-
cifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of 
the Tutsi group as a whole.279   
  
 274. 511 U.S. at 830. 
 275. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40. 
 276. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/ 
cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003).  
 277. Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women:  Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, 327 (2002) (allowed rape to be 
prosecuted as genocide); Llezlie L. Green, Gender Hate Propaganda and Sexual Violence in the 
Rwandan Genocide:  An Argument for Intersectionality in International Law, 33 Colum. Hum. Rights 
L. Rev. 733, 763 (rape “may constitute crime against humanity”). 
 278. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 12b. 
 279. Id. at ¶ 731. 
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The tribunal also found Akayesu guilty of crimes against humanity for 
rape.280  The tribunal defined rape and sexual violence as follows: “a 
physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under the cir-
cumstances which are coercive.  Sexual violence, which includes rape, is 
considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person 
under circumstances which are coercive.”281 
3.  Murder, in Furtherance of Forced Labor 
In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that, under certain circumstances, 
summary execution by a private individual violated international law.282  
Summary execution is a cognizable offense under the law of nations when 
committed under the color of state action.283  On the other hand, when a 
private individual commits murder, absent state action, it is not in violation 
of the law of nations.  Rather, such an action constitutes the local domestic 
crime of murder and nothing more.  In Doe II, the Ninth Circuit viewed 
murder as a component of forced labor, and therefore liability attached to 
Unocal.284  The correctness of this decision is not a matter of simple se-
mantics.  Unocal was alleged to have aided and abetted Myanmar.285  The 
murder of pipeline workers can be viewed as part and parcel of the forced 
labor program.  As such, the state action doctrine does not serve to prevent 
Unocal’s liability.286  Yet, even if it did, the court could still apply a Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(b) analysis.287  This rule permits the ad-
mission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts into evidence to prove motive and 
intent.288  Myanmar apparently utilized  summary execution to promote its 
forced labor program and Unocal benefited from the program. 
 
  
 280. Id. at ¶ 696. 
 281. Id. at ¶ 598. 
 282. 70 F.3d. at 243.  
 283. Id. 
 284. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *57. 
 285. Id. at *35. 
 286. Id. at *56. 
 287. FRE 404(b) precludes the admission of evidence of  “other crimes, wrong doings or acts,” unless 
such evidence is admitted for other purposes “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. . . .”  See e.g. U.S. v. Duffaut, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
24461 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2002). 
 288. Duffaut, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24461 at *209. 
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B.  Concepts of Universal Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and the 
Developing Nature of International Law:  The Ninth Circuit’s Expan-
sion in Choice of Law Application. 
The ATCA is silent as to what choice of law, international or domestic, 
to apply to ancillary issues.  The Ninth Circuit, as this paper argues, ex-
panded a concept of universal jurisdiction for torts when it applied non-
domestic standards to ancillary issues within the case.  The most important 
of these ancillary issues is accomplice liability.  This full incorporation of 
international legal principles was the basis of Judge Reinhardt’s disagree-
ment with the majority opinion.289  Was the majority wrong? 
One of the perceived difficulties in reconciling the criminal law basis 
of universal jurisdiction to tort deals with the choice of law to be employed 
by the adjudicating body.  Arguably, the inclusion of international over 
federal law was a step toward a universal jurisdiction for tort.  However, 
before analyzing the degree, if any, to which Doe II expanded universal 
jurisdiction to tort law, a brief overview may be helpful in delineating the 
criminal law basis of universal jurisdiction versus common understanding 
of tort law. 
Universal jurisdiction has been thought of internationally as a matter 
for criminal law.290  However, torts are thought of as having a transitory 
nature.291  That is, “a tort action which follows a tortfeasor wherever he 
goes.”292  Under domestic law, a person may sue in one state for a tort 
committed in another state, provided both in personam and subject matter 
jurisdiction exists.293  In order to obtain jurisdiction, there must be some 
contact with the trial forum.  Thus, even with its transitory nature, tort law 
has limitations.  Additionally, to date, international law places no obliga-
tion on a state to provide a tort remedy for violations of human rights.294  
  
 289. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *84-85 (Doe II). 
 290. See e.g. Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga:  A Comparative and International Law Analysis 
of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Intl. L. 1, 41-43 (2002) 
[hereinafter Translating Filartiga]. 
 291. See e.g. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L. Ed. 1158 (1933) (holding New 
Jersey citizen liable for New York auto accident caused by bailee); In re School Asbestos Litigation, 
921 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating tort is transitory rather than local). 
 292. Marcos I, 978 F.2d at 503. 
 293. See e.g. Intl. Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945) 
(“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional [conceptions] of fair play and substantial justice.’” (citations omitted));  Perkins v. Benguet 
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446, 72 S. Ct. 413, 418-19, 96 L. Ed. 485, 493 (1952) (If the defen-
dant’s activities in the forum are substantial, continuous, and systematic, general jurisdiction is avail-
able.  In other words, the foreign defendant is subject to suit even on matters unrelated to his or her 
contacts in the forum). 
 294. See e.g. Beth Stephens, Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 579, 602 (1997) (stat-
ing that a “remedy must be adjudicatory”). 
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As a result, there is no treaty or customary requirement that domestic 
courts use international law in place of domestic law for primary and ancil-
lary issues. 
Some scholars conclude “[u]niversal jurisdiction fills a gap where 
other, more basic doctrines of jurisdiction provide no basis for national 
proceedings.”295  These scholars argue that tort claims arising under the 
ATCA present such a case.296  Under the American system, criminal law 
has limitations, in that courts which adjudicate criminal law cases do not 
award, except under limited circumstances, financial penalties to vic-
tims.297  However, most crimes, constitute some type of tort.  Certainly, the 
plaintiffs’ allegations in Doe II embody both a crime and a tort. 
Both the district court in Doe I and the circuit court in Doe II accepted 
that tort, as defined by the ATCA—i.e., law of nations—possessed a type 
of universal jurisdiction.  This is perhaps because the actual torts alleged 
were based on, or at least akin to, “crimes against humanity.”298  These 
offenses possess universality because humanity itself is seen as a victim.299  
Additionally, this is partly why the Ninth Circuit saw the distinction be-
tween tort law and criminal law of minimal relevance.300 
Under international principles, “domestic jurisdiction rests on reconcil-
ing a state’s interest in a particular offense with other states’ interests in the 
offense.”301  That is, there are certain offenses of such gravity that the im-
portance of the geographic location of the offense is minimized.  That the 
allegations against Unocal fall into this category are best understood in 
light of the last sixty years of developing international law.  As World War 
II ended, allied representatives met in London to finalize a charter detailing 
the “constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military 
Tribunal” (IMT), which conducted the Nuremberg trials.302  The concept of 
  
 295. E.g. Bruce Broomhall, Symposium:  Universal Jurisdiction:  Myths, Realities, and Prospects:  
Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes under Interna-
tional Law, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 399, 400 (2001). 
 296. See generally Michael Ramsey, 18th Annual Symposium:  Multinational Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act:  Some Structural Concerns, 24 Hastings Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 361 
(2001).  (Professor Ramsey does not argue for universal jurisdiction under the ATCA.  Rather, his 
informative article highlights perceived problem areas for obtaining jurisdiction.) 
 297. Stephens, Translating Filartiga, supra n. 301, at 58. 
 298. See e.g. Susan Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order:  Defining the Elements of Crimes 
Against Humanity, 10 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 307, 309 (2000). 
 299. E.g. Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations:  The Universal 
Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 Denv. J. Intl. L. & Policy 591, 622 (1998). 
 300. See Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *44 (Doe II). 
 301. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 Tex L. Rev. 785, 786 
(1988). 
 302. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis Powers and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, (Aug 8, 1945) 59 Stat. 1544, 
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement].  Article 2 of the London agreement states that “[t]he 
constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal shall be those set in the 
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universal jurisdiction for certain offenses gained initial acceptance through 
the IMT, and the International Military Tribunals for the Far East,303 as 
well as the 1968 Israeli trial of Adolph Eichmann.304  Indeed, other foreign 
courts have accepted universal jurisdiction concepts developed in the 
Eichmann trial.  For example, in the 1989 Ontario High Court of Justice 
case, Regina v. Finta,305 a Canadian court accepted the principle that state 
courts can exercise criminal law jurisdiction “with respect to acts which 
occurred outside its territory.”306  In 1999, a Swiss Military Tribunal in-
dicted and convicted a former Rwandan mayor for war crimes stemming 
from the Rwandan genocide.307  These trials added to the growing accep-
tance that some offenses, such as genocide, constitute crimes against hu-
  
Charter annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement.”  Id. at 
1544-45.  In the course of World War II, the Allied Governments issued several declarations concern-
ing the punishment of war criminals.  On October 7, 1942, it was announced that a United Nations War 
Crimes Commission would be set up for the investigation of war crimes.  However, it was not until 
October 20, 1943, that the actual establishment of the Commission took place.  In the Moscow Declara-
tion of October 30, 1943, the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union issued a joint statement 
that the German war criminals should be judged and punished in the countries in which their crimes 
were committed, but that, “the major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographic localiza-
tion,” would be punished “by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.”  See The Laws of 
Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, 881 (Dietrich 
Schindler et al. eds., 3d ed., Martinus Nijhoff 1988). 
 303. Id. at 912-919.  The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established by a special 
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander in the Far East for the Allied 
Powers.  Id. 
 304. Israel v. Eichamnn, 36 Intl. L. Rep. 5 (Jerusalem D.C. 1961) (Criminal Case no. 46/61).  In 
Eichmann, the court recognized universal jurisdiction to prosecute an offense against the Jewish people 
that occurred prior to the formation of the State of Israel.  The court specifically held: 
 
The State of Israel’s ‘right to punish’, the accused derives, in our view, from two cumulative  
sources:  a universal source (pertaining to the whole of mankind), which vests the right to  
prosecute and punish crimes of this order in every State within the family of nations; and a 
specific or national source, which gives the victim nation the right to try any who assault its 
existence. 
 
Id. at ¶ 30 
 305. 1989 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 8889 (Ontario High Ct. J. June 26, 1989). 
 306. Id. at (*40). 
 
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising  juris-
diction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken 
place abroad, -and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law.  
Such a rule would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to 
States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, 
property and acts outside their territory . . . 
 
Id. at *41 (quoting the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Steamship Lotus, Series A, No. 
10 (Permanent Ct. Intl. J. 1927)). 
 307. See Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor (Trib. Militarie de cassation, Apr. 27, 2001); Amnesty Inter-
national, 2000, Annual Report on Switzerland < http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/ 
webeurcountries/SWITZERLAND?OpenDocument> (accessed June 27, 2003). 
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manity that can be prosecuted at any location by any recognized court 
complying with basic procedural rights.  This acceptance is partly a prod-
uct of twentieth century history.  Following World War II, treaties and 
agreements codified crimes against humanity.  In the 1990’s two ad hoc 
tribunals were created by the United Nations Security Council to prosecute 
individuals responsible for conducting, in part, crimes against humanity.  
These tribunals dealt with crimes against humanity in the former Yugosla-
via (ICTY)308 and Rwanda (ICTR).309  The Ninth Circuit expressly referred 
to the importance of ICTR and ICTY decisions in furnishing international 
law legal definitions.310 
As noted in Section III, several district and appellate court cases in-
volving corporate liability under the ATCA existed prior to Doe II.  None 
of these cases precluded civil action against corporations acting in concert 
with foreign governments, or even engaging in independent activities.  
That these cases were dismissed on grounds other than jurisdiction, is a 
matter of semantics in assessing whether the acceptance of corporate liabil-
ity under the ATCA expands the statute’s universal jurisdiction.  On the 
other hand, the choice of international law over federal common law for 
defining ancillary issues expanded a concept of universal jurisdiction for 
tort under the ATCA.  The Ninth Circuit had limited guidance in that only 
one prior federal court decision addressed the choice of law issue.  In Xun-
cax v. Gramajo,311 the United States District Court for Massachusetts con-
cluded only international law fulfilled the expectations of the ATCA.312  
However, Xuncax did not involve a corporate defendant, but rather a for-
mer Guatemalan government official.313 
Other, non ATCA cases, provide some guidance in assessing whether 
Doe II’s expansion is justified.  As early as 1804, the Supreme Court in 
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy established a principle that “an 
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of na-
tions.”314  Since that time, several courts have held customary international 
  
 308. U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993), reprinted in 32 Intl. Leg. Materials 1192 (1993) (statute of 
ICTY). 
 309. United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, S.C. Res. 955, 49 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the ICTR). 
 310. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *45 (Doe II). 
 311. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); see Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator:  The Alien Tort Liabil-
ity of Transnational Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 Colum. Hum. Rights L. Rev, 
359, 403 (1999) (arguing “the language of section 1350 itself suggests that international law is the 
substantive law to be applied.”  However, he does not detail further analysis as to why). 
 312. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 313. Id. at 169. 
 314. 6 U.S. 64, 118, 2 L. Ed. 208, 226 (1804). 
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law was a part of federal common law.315  For example, in Banco Nacion-
ale de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,316 the Second Circuit held that un-
der customary international law, an obligation existed to provide full com-
pensation for an unlawful taking.317  Taking both the Charming Betsey 
principle, and the fact that Congress has never delineated definitions of 
liability under the ATCA, a valid argument exists for incorporating inter-
national law to issues of liability under the ATCA. 
Whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in its expansion of universal ju-
risdiction can be answered by looking to factors generally considered in 
choice of law inquiries.  Pertinent factors are enumerated in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws.318  Judge Reinhardt viewed chapter 1, 
section 6 as helpful, but before reading that section, it is important to un-
derstand its context, which is provided in section 1.  Section 1 reads: 
The world is composed of territorial states having separate and dif-
fering systems of law.  Events and transactions occur, and issues 
arise, that may have a significant relationship to more than one 
state, making necessary a special body of rules and methods for 
their ordering and resolution.319 
 
Section 6 reads as follows: 
(1)  A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a 
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law. 
(2)  When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the 
choice of the applicable rule of law include: 
(a)  the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b)  the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c)  the relevant policies of other interested states and the rela-
tive interests of those states in the determination of the particu-
lar issue, 
(d)  the protection of justified expectations, 
(e)  the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
  
 315. See e.g. Harold H. Koh, Is International Law Really State Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824, 1837-38 
(1998) (Professor Koh cites other cases relating to extradition, official immunity, and prisoner 
treatment that incorporate customary international law into federal common law.). 
 316. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 317. Id. at 892-93. 
 318. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ch. 1 § 1 (1971). 
 319. Id. 
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(f)  certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and 
(g)  ease in the determination and application of the law to be 
applied.320 
 Both the majority and concurring opinions in Doe II correctly recog-
nized the ATCA is silent as to a statutory directive on choice of law.  The 
majority held that “‘the needs of the international system’ are better served 
by applying international law than national law.”321  In terms of “‘the pro-
tection of justified expectations”; “the ‘certainty, predictability, and uni-
formity of the result’”; and “the ‘ease in the determination and application 
of the law to be applied,’” the court noted that their decision embodied 
principles dating back to the Nuremburg Tribunals.322  The majority’s logic 
is sensible for two reasons.  First, based on the widespread knowledge of 
human rights conditions in Myanmar, Unocal cannot claim the corporation 
was surprised by the nature of the plaintiffs’ allegations.  Likewise, based 
on well-known and long established international law principles, high-
lighted throughout this article, Unocal could not argue a lack of notice of 
these laws.  All Unocal could argue was a lack of notice that the court 
would apply principles developed in the ICTY and ICTR to ancillary is-
sues in Doe.  But, even this argument has a fundamental weakness stem-
ming from the nature of the relationship between tort and criminal law.  In 
this case, the torts alleged, if true, violated a universal understanding of 
international law.  In other cases, courts have applied international law to 
definitional matters.323 
Finally, some scholars and judges have advanced domestic law princi-
ples as the proper means to determine liability.324  Some of the principles 
advanced are agency law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and reckless disregard.325  
But, these arguments for purely relying on domestic law tend to ignore the 
issue that the trier of fact must determine whether a tort committed under 
the law of nations occurred.  In Doe II, the torts are purely criminal in na-
ture.  The allegations are not a matter of simple negligence.  As noted 
above, almost every crime is a tort.  However, the inverse is not necessarily 
true.  Of course, the plaintiffs could advance alternative domestic theories 
of liability as well.  But the essential core of this case is a tort determina-
  
 320. Id. at § 6. 
 321. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *42 (Doe II). 
 322. Id. 
 323. See e.g. Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002); 
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
 324. See e.g. Courtney Shaw, Student Author, NOTE: Uncertain Justice:  Liability of Multinationals 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1359, 1374-1379 (2002) (arguing for liability under 
42 U.S.C. §1983). 
 325. See e.g. id. 
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tion of internationally recognized criminal activity.  In this limited arena, 
the Ninth Circuit was correct in applying international definitions to the 
ancillary issue of accomplice liability. 
Having established that the Ninth Circuit correctly expanded a univer-
sal jurisdiction to a tort under the ATCA, the fairness inquiry then becomes 
one of determining how different the international law standards are from 
the federal common law of accomplice liability.  In essence, this is a dual 
question of both comparative law and examining Unocal’s role in aiding 
and abetting forced labor. 
C.  The Ninth Circuit’s Definition of Accomplice Liability:  Aiding and 
Abetting under the International Law as opposed to Domestic Law. 
In order to analyze the difference between the international and domes-
tic law understanding of accomplice liability, it is first beneficial to define 
“aiding and abetting,” under federal law.  “Aiding and abetting” is essen-
tially a criminal law term.  It does not constitute elements of a particular 
crime because the concept, and corresponding federal  statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
2, provides a means for convicting a person for an offense caused by a 
principal.326  There are usually two components to criminal offenses: actus 
reus and mens rea.  Actus reus consists of an actual physical act while 
mens rea denotes the actor’s mental state.327 
In criminal law, the elements of “aiding and abetting” are generally as 
follows:  (1) the principal commits a substantive offense and (2) the defen-
dant charged with the “aiding and abetting” “consciously shared the prin-
cipal’s knowledge of the underlying criminal act, and intended to help the 
principal.”328  The actus reus element of “aiding and abetting” is generally 
easy to discern because under a theory of accomplice liability, to be guilty, 
the defendant must commit an act in furtherance of the principal’s of-
fense.329  For example, where a defendant supplied the principal with a 
weapon later used in a bank robbery, the actus reus requirement is satis-
  
 326. See 18 U.S.C. § 2.  The statute does not define a separate crime, but rather provides another 
means of convicting someone of assisting another in committing the underlying offense.  E.g. U.S. v. 
Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1998).  In that case, the Fifth Circuit listed three conditions—or 
elements—of proof to establish guilt.  Id.  In a criminal trial, in order to prove a defendant guilty of 
aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2, three elements must be met.  Id.  First, that the defendant 
associated with the criminal venture.  Second, that the defendant participated in the venture.  Id.  Third, 
that the defendant sought by action to make the venture at succeed.  Id. (citation omitted).  
 327. Black’s Law Dictionary defines actus reus as the physical aspect of a crime, whereas mens rea 
involves the intent factor.  36 (Henry L. Black et. al eds., 6th ed., West 1990).  
 328. See e.g 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); Nye & Nissan Corp. v. U.S., 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S. Ct. 766, 770, 93 
L. Ed. 919, 925 (1949); U.S. v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S. v. Taylor, 54 
F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 329. U.S. v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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fied.330  On the other hand, the defendant’s mental state is important for 
assessing whether the mens rea was present to prove guilt.  Indeed, the 
defendant’s beforehand knowledge of the principal’s offense is central to 
establishing the applicable mens rea for accomplice liability.  However, a 
“classic formulation of aider and abettor liability . . . does not make the 
knowledge requirement”331 facially clear because some courts have con-
strued this requirement to mean less than full knowledge of an intended 
act.332  For example, in U.S. v. Hill, a case involving an illegal gambling 
enterprise, the Sixth Circuit defined knowledge as “‘the general scope and 
nature . . . and awareness of the general facts concerning the venture.’”333  
Thus, the knowledge requirement is less than a knowing of intricacies, but 
rather, knowledge of general purpose.  In order to determine Doe II’s fair-
ness, the Ninth Circuit’s view of “aiding and abetting” must be viewed in 
the context that it has been used by the ICTY and ICTR as well as older 
international bodies.334 
As noted in Section II, the Ninth Circuit established the standard for 
“aiding and abetting” under the ATCA in Doe II as “knowing practical 
assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetra-
tion of the crime.”335  In incorporating the ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Fu-
rundzija,336 the Ninth Circuit recognized an international law concept es-
tablishing the “actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal 
law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which 
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”337  Moreover, the 
court accepted that “assistance, ‘need not constitute an indispensable ele-
ment, that is, a conditio sine qua non, for the acts of the principal.’”338  The 
Ninth Circuit also reviewed the ICTR’s interpretation of “aiding and abet-
ting” in the case Prosecutor v. Musema.339  In that case, the ICTR’s defini-
tion for the actus reus element consisted of “‘all acts of assistance in the 
form of either physical or moral support . . . [that] substantially contribute 
to the commission of the crime.’”340  In essence, the plaintiffs do not have 
  
 330. See id. 
 331. U.S. v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 332. See e.g. id. (quoting U.S. v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)). 
 333. Id. 
 334. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *36. 
 335. Id.  
 336. IT-95-17/1-T ( Dec. 10 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999). 
 337. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *45-46 (quoting Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T at ¶ 235).  Further, 
the Ninth Circuit  found that the evidence “support[ed] the conclusion that Unocal gave ‘encourage-
ment’ to the Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor.”  Id. at *53. 
 338. Id. at *45 (Doe II) (quoting Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T at § 3.3(c) ¶ 209). 
 339. Id. at *47 (Doe II) (quoting Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A (ICTR Jan. 27, 2000) 
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/index.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003)). 
 340. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A at § 3.1.1 ¶ 126. 
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to prove that Unocal’s assistance made the forced labor possible.  Rather, 
the plaintiffs need only prove the Myanmar Military utilized Unocal’s as-
sistance.  This is a relatively easy burden because of Unocal’s investment 
in the Yadana Project as well as its technical assistance in the construction. 
Additionally, the court further recognized the international law concept 
for the mens rea of “aiding and abetting” as “actual or constructive . . . 
knowledge [that the accomplice’s] actions will assist the perpetrator in the 
commission of the crime.”341  This reflected the ICTR’s view in Musema 
that defined the mens rea element as “‘[knowledge] of the assistance he 
was providing in the commission of the actual offense.’”342  Again, this is a 
fairly easy burden for the plaintiffs due to the amount of public information 
on Myanmar’s human rights record available to Unocal.343 
Clearly, the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the ICTY and ICTR 
definition of “aiding and abetting.”  How the court’s definition disadvan-
tages Unocal is less clear.  It is true that actual knowledge is not required 
under either domestic or international law, as evidenced in the ICTR and 
ICTY cases discussed in this article.  It is also true that within the ICTY 
and ICTR definition of “aiding and abetting”, moral support can establish 
the actus reus.  None of the ICTR and ICTY cases involve funding.  How-
ever, an analogy can be drawn to other activities of support.  For example, 
in the ICTR case, Prosecutor v. George Ruggiu,344 the tribunal found a 
journalist guilty as a de facto aider and abettor for making several broad-
casts encouraging Hutu to kill Tutsi.345  In Doe II, Unocal is not alleged to 
have provided moral support in the sense of a radio broadcast.  Yet, a com-
pelling analogy can be drawn that Unocal’s financial and advisory relation-
ship with the Myanmar Military provided support. 
As noted above, the plaintiffs’ allegations established a prima facie 
case against Unocal under the court’s definition of “aiding and abetting.”  
In viewing the prima facie determination, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that, the standard burden of proof in civil suits is by a “preponderance of 
the evidence” not beyond a “reasonable doubt.”346  There was evidence 
Unocal knew about general allegations of human rights violations such as 
forced labor.347  Additionally, Unocal knew Total had contracted with 
SLORC for the Myanmar Military to provide security for the pipeline con-
  
 341. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *47 (Doe II) (quoting Musema, ICTR-96-13-A at § 3.11 ¶ 
126) (brackets in original). 
 342. Id. at *48  (quoting Musema, ICTR-96-13-A at § 3.22 ¶ 180).  
 343. Id. at *53 n. 29 
 344. ICTR-97-32-I ( ICTR June 1, 2000). 
 345. Id. at ¶ 44 (a). 
 346. For a discussion of standards of proof, see e.g. U.S. v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
 347. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *15 (Doe II). 
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struction project.348  Lastly, Unocal’s involvement in attending security 
meetings and overseeing the joint venture349 along with Total and MOGE 
could be seen as evidence of rendering assistance or encouragement to the 
Myanmar Military.350  Applying the evidence accepted by the court to a 
domestic standard of “aiding and abetting,” there is a prima facie case es-
tablished as well.  The participation in a joint venture with a known of-
fender is one aspect of establishing a prima facie case.  Unocal’s various 
acts of attending joint venture meetings,351 and supplying funds and con-
struction oversight crews352 for the Yadana project clearly go to the actus 
reus element.353  As for the mens rea requirement, the court record appears 
to contain enough evidence showing knowledge.354  E-mails between com-
pany officers,355 advice from consultants,356 notice from a Total representa-
tive, and repeated contacts from NGO’s357 show a prima facie case of 
knowledge.   
VI.  EXAMINING THE FORESEEN CONSEQUENCES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
DECISION TO OTHERWISE APPLICABLE DEFENSES:  ACT OF STATE, RULE 
19, AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
A.  Act of State Doctrine 
The act of state doctrine has evolved since its conception.358  Initially, 
the doctrine was seen as a principle of comity between sovereign states.359  
However, it has transformed into a prudential concern regarding the sepa-
ration of powers.360  The Court in Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino 
recognized the executive’s role in foreign policy, including fostering hu-
man rights and democracy.361  When the executive branch, through the 
  
 348. Id. at *7. 
 349. Id. at *53. 
 350. Id. at *49. 
 351. Id. at *117.  
 352. Id. at *60. 
 353. Id. at *51. 
 354. Id. at *54. 
 355. Id. at *40. 
 356. Id. at *13. 
 357. Id. at *14. 
 358. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics, 493 U.S. 400, 404, 110 S. Ct. 701, 704, 107 L. Ed. 
816, 822, (1990). 
 359. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Lumber Co., 246 U.S. 297, 
303-304, 38 S. Ct. 309, 311, 62 L. Ed. 726, 732 (1918)). 
 360. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423).  
 361. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404.  The Court fashioned a three-part test to determine 
whether the act of state doctrine should apply.  This test is as follows: 
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State Department, files a brief with the court, the executive branch’s argu-
ments are given tremendous deference.362  For example, in a recent ATCA 
case against ExxonMobil and Indonesia, in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, the State Department filed an amicus brief.363  
This filing was done in response to a specific judicial request.364  As of this 
article’s publication date, the court has not decided whether dismissal un-
der this doctrine is appropriate.  Thus, a corporation such as Unocal could 
have the executive branch as a powerful ally in any ATCA court proceed-
ing.  Such a legal defense however, becomes almost untenable without the 
assistance of the executive branch. 
In Doe II, the Ninth Circuit recognized the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Kadic, that “it would be a rare case in which the act of state doctrine pre-
cluded suit under [the [ATCA]].”365  This is, in part, because, jus cogens 
violations tend to diminish the act of state defense’s vitality.366  However, 
the Ninth Circuit declined to establish a blanket rule barring the act of state 
doctrine in ATCA cases.367  In part, this may have been because the execu-
  
[1]  The greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of in-
ternational law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . 
. .  [2]  The less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the 
weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.  [3]  The balance of rele-
vant considerations may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged 
act of state is no longer in existence . . . . 
 
Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at * 72 (Doe II) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428) (ellipses and 
brackets from Doe II). 
The Ninth Circuit added a fourth factor to this test in holding, “we must also consider whether the state 
was acting in the public interest.  Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at * 72 (Doe II) (quoting Liu v. 
Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 
 362. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 419. 
 363. See Amicus Curiae, United States Statement of Interest, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Civ. Action 
No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. July 29, 2002).  In this brief, the United States avers: 
 
[T]he Department of State believes that adjudication of this lawsuit at this time would in 
fact risk a serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States . . . related di-
rectly to the on-going struggle against international terrorism.  It may also diminish our abil-
ity to work with the Government of  Indonesia (“GOI”) on a variety of important programs, 
including efforts to promote human rights in Indonesia. 
 
Id. at 1. 
The brief further details economic interests in writing:  “This litigation appears likely to further dis-
courage foreign investment, particularly in extractive industries in remote or unstable areas that require 
security protection.  This, in turn, could have decidedly negative consequences for the Indonesian 
economy.”  Id. at 4. 
 364. Id. at 1. 
 365. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *71 (Doe II) (quoting Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250.  Brackets in 
original). 
 366. See id. at *73. 
 367. See id. at ** 71-73. 
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tive branch did not file an amicus brief to the court.  Lastly, the court’s 
reasoning in Doe was not inconsistent with prior case decisions from other 
circuit courts.  For example, in Bigio v. Coca-Cola, the Second Circuit held 
the act of state doctrine was to be determined on a case-by-case basis.368  
As such, the common sense of the court may likely compose a significant 
factor in determining whether permitting adjudication will “likely impact 
foreign relations,” or “embarrass or hinder the executive in the realm of 
foreign relations.369  Based on its view of common sense, the court deter-
mined the act of state doctrine did not apply.370 
1.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 19 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 19 requires that indis-
pensable parties to a lawsuit must be identified.371  As noted earlier, corpo-
rate defendants in prior ATCA cases have benefited from this rule.  The 
district court, in denying Unocal’s FRCP Rule 19 dismissal, set precedent 
for cases involving forced labor.  So too did the Ninth Circuit in not re-
viewing this issue.  It may be argued that Rule 19 should not apply in any 
ATCA case.  If an act committed “in violation of the law of nations” is 
truly akin to a crime against humanity, then liability should not give way to 
dismissal under Rule 19.  If future courts accept this logic, then Doe II is 
truly a revolutionary case.  If, on the other hand, Doe II is merely narrowed 
to economic expectations and possible financial damage weighing, then it 
joins a group of persuasive cases. 
2.  Remaining Jurisdictional Issues:  Does Forum Non Conveniens 
Apply to ATCA claims? 
Doe II did not squarely address the issue of forum non conveniens, but 
it warrants discussion in this article because all of the litigation elements 
regarding this doctrine exist in the history of Doe (I & II).  The doctrine of 
forum non conveniens involves the dismissal of lawsuits brought by plain-
tiffs in their favored forum in favor of adjudication in a foreign court.372  It 
  
 368. 239 F.3d at 452 (citing Allied Bank Intl. v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 515, 
520 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at 444.  The Court noted that the Bigios’ property was confiscated by the administration of 
then President Nasser.  Id.  At the time of the case, Nasser had been dead for thirty years.  Id. 
 371. FRCP 19(a) provides that a person is a necessary party if:  “(1) in the person’s absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action . . .” 
 372. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504, 67 S. Ct. 839, 841, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 1060 (1947); 
Koster v. Am. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. 330 U.S. 518, 531-32, 67 S. Ct. 828, 835, 91 L. Ed. 1067, 
1077-78 (1947). 
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“is a discretionary device permitting a court in rare instances to ‘dismiss a 
claim even if the court is a permissible venue with proper jurisdiction over 
the claim.’”373  A two-step process developed to assess whether forum non 
conveniens dismissal is appropriate.  The first step involves determining 
whether an adequate alternative forum exists.374  If the answer is in the 
affirmative, the second step requires courts to “balance a series of factors 
involving the private interests of the parties in maintaining the litigation in 
the competing fora and any public interests at stake.”375  This doctrine’s 
applicability to claims arising under the ATCA is questionable for a num-
ber of reasons.  First, human rights abuses violating international rights 
rarely occur in a state with a defined and respectable legal system.  Second, 
because the ATCA requires state action, or as argued in this article com-
mercial activity rising to the level of state action, it is unlikely the host 
government will permit a fair hearing. 
In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company376 the Second Circuit ad-
dressed the doctrine in light of the ATCA.  Wiwa involved Nigerian plain-
tiffs alleging that the Nigerian government tortured and killed family 
members and themselves at the behest of Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Oil Nigeria (SON).377  The parent company of SON, Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, and one of its subsidiaries pertinent to the suit, Shell 
Transport and Trading Company (STTC), were listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange and maintained an investor relations office in New York 
City.378  However, Royal Dutch Petroleum and STCC were incorporated in 
the Netherlands and Great Britain.379  Additionally, one of Royal Dutch 
Petroleum’s subsidiaries, Shell Petroleum Inc (SPI), and SPI’s subsidiary, 
Shell Oil Company performed extensive commerce operations in the 
United States.380  The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit under the 
forum non conveniens doctrine.381  This occurred, in part, because the de-
fendant corporation argued the case should be tried in Great Britain.382  As 
to the second prong, the district court found a balancing of public and pri-
  
 373. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d. 88, 100 (quoting PT United Can Co. v. Crown 
Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 374. Id. (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07). 
 375. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09). 
 376. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 377. Id. at 92. 
 378. Id. at 93. 
 379. Id. at 92. 
 380. Id. at 93. 
 381. Id. at 108. 
 382. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100. 
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vate factors made the British forum preferable.383  However, the Second 
Circuit concluded the district court failed to give weight to three significant 
considerations that favored retaining jurisdiction.384  First, the court held 
that since one of the plaintiffs was a United States resident, retaining juris-
diction was proper.385  Second, the court held United States interests in 
furnishing a forum to litigate claims of violations of international standards 
of the law of human rights were compelling.386  Finally, although the court 
recognized British courts as “exemplary in their fairness and commitment 
to the rule of law,” this recognition did not outweigh the interests of either 
prior reason.387 
In Wiwa the Second Circuit declined to readdress the original intent 
behind the ATCA.388  Rather, the court found, that after the TVPA was 
incorporated into the ATCA, the ATCA expressed “a policy favoring re-
ceptivity by our courts to such suits.”389  The court reasoned that permitting 
a forum non conveniens dismissal could represent a setback for human 
rights litigation.390  However, the court declined to establish an across the 
board rule that denied forum non conveniens to defendants in all ATCA 
cases.391  Instead, the court determined forum non conveniens dismissal 
could not be granted, “unless the defendant has fully met the burden of 
showing that the Gilbert factors ‘tilt[] strongly in favor of trial in the 
foreign forum.’”392  Should Doe II not settle and be upheld, it appears 
likely from the language of Doe II, relying on the Wiwa precedent, that 
forum non conveniens is not an option for Unocal. 
  
 383.  Id. at 92.  The plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the British forum “because three doctrines 
of English law—double actionability, transmissibility, and the act of state doctrine—created a likely 
bar to a British court” hearing the suit.  Id. at 100. 
 384. Id. at 101. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 105 n. 10.  “Whatever the intent of the original legislators (a matter that is forever hidden 
from our view by the scarcity of relevant evidence), the text of the Act seems to reach claims for inter-
national human rights abuses occurring abroad.”  Id. 
 389. Id. at 105.  In determining the effect of the TVPA on the ATCA, the court viewed two changes 
in the statutory wording.  First, there was a shift “from addressing the courts’ ‘jurisdiction’ to address-
ing substantive rights.”  Second, “the change from the ATCA’s description of the claim as one for ‘tort 
. . . committed in violation of the law of nations . . .’ to the new Act’s assertion of the substantive right 
to damages under U.S. law.”  Id.  
 390. Id. at 105. 
 391. Id. at 106.  The court states “This is not to suggest that the TVPA has nullified, or even signifi-
cantly diminished, the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  The statute has, however, communicated a 
policy that such suits should not be facilely dismissed on the assumption that the ostensibly foreign 
controversy is not our business.”  Id.  
 392. Id. (quoting R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
File: Kast (Macro) Final 8-21 Created on:  8/22/2003 2:50 PM Last Printed: 8/22/2003 2:50 PM 
180 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 1, No. 3/4 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
When the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court in Doe II, new prece-
dent was set.  While there was nothing inherently wrong in the court’s le-
gal interpretation, the decision, if upheld, will have dramatic effect on the 
law.  The ATCA will not only provide plaintiffs with a remedy against 
corporations “aiding and abetting” human rights violators, it may also 
cause multinational corporations to better monitor their overseas financial 
activities.  Perhaps this deterrent will better promote human rights and de-
mocratic development in troubled areas.  The reason for this possibility 
rests in the expansion of a universal jurisdiction for tort.  The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s choice of law analysis is broad, but correct for the limited purpose of 
adjudicating claims under the statute.  The analysis is fair in that the result 
differs little from domestic civil theories.  It is also fair in that the choice of 
law better reflects the nature of offenses committed in violation of the laws 
of nations.  Finally, the foreseeable circumstances are not so burdensome 
as to inhibit overseas commerce.  Rather, it will provide victims of human 
rights abuses committed in violation of international law with a forum for 
redress.  Additionally, it may result in forcing multinational corporations 
from the role of enabler of violator regime to a true reforming influence. 
 
